INTERNATIONAL THREAT AND THE COHESIVENESS OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY

A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
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In Partial Fulfillment
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in
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by
Ronald Thomas Fox
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In studying group dynamics, investigators have concentrated much attention on factors which increase, and decrease, the cohesiveness of groups. One such factor of particular interest is external threat. It has long been suspected that when groups are exposed to external danger, they tend to show a remarkable increase in internal cohesiveness; their members manifest increased motivation to enhance group unity in an effort collectively to resist the external danger. There have been several attempts to test this supposition, usually involving small, experimental groups.[1] Small group experiments facilitate research endeavors since potential intervening variables can be controlled. However, because of their limited scope of analysis, such experiments do not permit broad, inclusive generalizations.[2] It remains to be seen whether the external-threat-increased-cohesion hypothesis applies to large groups and even to entire social systems.

While some of the small group studies have tended to support the hypothesis, others have shown the contrary effect. Given a set of specific conditions, some

groups "break up"--become less cohesive--when confronted with external threats. In view of these contradictory results, there can be no definitive conclusions drawn about the actual effect of external threats on group cohesiveness. Are different types of groups affected differently by external threats? What underlying factors are influential in the external threat-cohesion relationship? The purpose of this study is to conduct a cross-national analysis of the external threat-cohesion problem in order to ascertain the relationship between international threat and the cohesiveness of political systems. In investigating this problem, various national characteristics which may be influential in the external threat-cohesion relationship are also explored.

The national political system was chosen as the basic unit of analysis because relevant data, in aggregate form, are available, and because the behavior of political systems can be considered one of the outstanding problems of the present era. The cross-national method of analysis, in which evidence from many cases is compared, was selected over the case study approach since it yields findings of wider generality, thus allowing more inclusive and meaningful inferences. What is sought is a set of generalized propositions

concerning the external threat-cohesion relationship as it applies to political systems.

If the ability to make broad generalizations from the findings is a chief advantage of the cross-national method over the case study approach, then why is the technique used so infrequently? The reason is that there are also serious limitations to the approach. Among them is the paucity and reliability of cross-national data. Since the quality of data may vary from polity to polity, care must be taken to ensure that data used for any cross-national study are sufficiently valid and reliable. Employment of the cross-national method of analysis in this study was thus made dependent on the availability of data which met these requirements.

In order to make empirical analysis possible, the theoretical concepts of external threat and cohesion are translated into observational terms and measured cross-nationally for a seven-year period. As to the universe, all nations are included for which data are available.[3] This encompasses a total of eighty-three nations. In addition to this universe, to explore further the dynamics of the external threat-cohesion relationship, several homogeneous clusters of nations are employed. The clusters used are: stable and unstable countries;

sociocultural groupings--West European, Anglo-Saxon, East European, Asian, and Latin American; traditional, transitional, and modern countries; and coercive, moderately coercive, and permissive countries. The external threat-cohesion relationship is observed for each of these clusters in an effort to uncover differing patterns of behavior.

The methodology employed in this study attempts to follow the precepts of scientific method as espoused by contemporary behavioral scientists.[4]

1. Theoretically relevant hypotheses are generated from the external threat-cohesion theory;
2. All variables are theoretically defined, operationalized, and quantitatively measured;
3. Data sources which have been judged to be both valid and reasonably reliable are employed;
4. Cross-national profiles of cohesion and external threat are constructed; and
5. Appropriate correlational techniques are used to compare the data and test the generated hypotheses.

It is essential that these criteria be satisfactorily met, if we hope to test the validity of the theory. J. David Singer sums up this requirement when he points out that in the absence of a research design providing for these criteria, "a piece of research may well produce some adequate description, but it is unlikely to be of much use for explanatory or predictive purposes."[5]

In sum, this study will test in a systematic fashion, using the cross-national setting, hypotheses generated from the provocative theory of social psychology that groups tend to become more cohesive when externally threatened. The study should be judged on its specific findings and as an exploratory effort that suggests further investigations in this area.

In Chapter II, an examination of the external threat-cohesion theory is given. Definition and operationalization of the variables used in this study, and a brief description of the techniques of analysis to be employed, are presented in Chapter III. The empirical findings are reported in Chapter IV. Chapter V embodies the conclusions and possible explanations of the findings, and suggests further studies which might be conducted in this area.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1]A classic empirical study of group integration during a crisis is found in Durkheim's Suicide (Illinois: Free Press, 1951). Some later related studies are: J. T. Lanzetta, "Group Behavior Under Stress," Human Relations, VIII, No. 1 (1955), 29-52; Stanley Schachter, et al., "Cross-Cultural Experiments in Threat and Rejection," Human Relations, VII, No. 4 (1954), 403-440; G. E. Swanson, "A Preliminary Study of the Acting Crowd," American Sociological Review, XVIII (1953), 522-533; Robert L. Hamblin, "Group Integration During a Crisis," Human Relations, XI, No. 1 (1958), 67-76; and Robert C. North, Howard E. Koch, Jr., and Dina A. Zinnes, "The Integrative Function of Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV (September, 1960), 355-374. This list is not meant to be exhaustive; it is presented to illustrate that different researchers, using very different designs, have found behavior indicative of integration in urgent situations involving common threats.

[2]With small group experiments, there is the temptation to infer more from the findings than is allowable, and thus commit what is sometimes referred to as a "fallacy of the wrong level" error. For a discussion of this type of error, see Johan Galtung, Theory and Method of Social Research (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 79-80; and Erwin K. Scheuch, "Cross-National Data Comparisons Using Aggregate Data: Some Substantive and Methodological Problems," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 131-169.

[3]For the purposes of this study, a nation is a geographical area with legally defined boundaries, which possesses the character of sovereignty as evidenced by diplomatic relations with other countries.

[4]The following sources on behavioral research were consulted: Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964); Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1952); Hubert M. Blalock and Ann B. Blalock, Methodology in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968); Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960); Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964); Galtung, op. cit.; Merritt and Rokkan, op. cit.; and J. David Singer, "The Relevance of Behavioral Sciences to the Study of International Relations," Behavioral Science, VI, No. 4 (October, 1961), 324-335.

[5]Singer, op. cit., p. 328.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Nature of Group Cohesiveness

Before presenting theoretical formulations concerning the external threat-cohesion relationship, it is helpful to clarify first what is meant by the term cohesiveness. As a concept, cohesiveness is vague; it has meant different things, and has been used in different ways by many theorists and researchers. Literally, it refers to the way in which a group sticks together, in any or all of several possible ways, so that the group has unity. Viewing cohesiveness simply as "stick-togetherness," however, does not provide the conceptual clarity needed to convey the precise meaning of the term.

The frequent use of cohesion as a catchall notion that includes almost anything that can be said about a group hinders clarification of the term. The reason the term tends to be so inclusive is that cohesiveness can manifest itself in so many different ways, and so many different factors can contribute to the same end result. It is a very complex property of groups, but it is not all-inclusive. In this sense, as Newcomb points out, it

is something like individual intelligence. Whereas intelligence can be conceptualized as a single entity--the ability to learn or solve problems--it is more accurately understood as a combination of several factors: word fluency, ability to use numbers, perceptual speed, and reasoning. These terms are distinct and yet have something in common.[1] Just as intelligence is only one of many properties that individuals have, so it is with cohesion--one of the many properties of groups.

Although several conceptualizations of cohesiveness have been employed, three general classes of meanings can be distinguished:[2]

1. The attractiveness of the group for its members;
2. The coordination of the efforts of members; and
3. The level of motivation of group members to perform a task with zeal and efficiency.

The relevance of the second and third meanings, above, are frequently disputed; they seem more closely associated with group morale, a related, but distinctive group property. The first meaning, by far the most widely employed, has proven quite fruitful in research,

as many investigators have operationalized cohesion within this framework, and verified derived hypotheses.

With respect to the first meaning, cohesion is most commonly defined as the resultant of the total field of forces which influence members both to remain in and to leave a group.[3] There are three types of components involved in this definition: (1) forces derived from the attractiveness or positive valence of the group; (2) forces the source of which is the attractiveness of alternative membership; and (3) forces resulting from barriers or restraints against leaving the group. Most investigators have focused on the first component--the "attraction" forces of the group--and many methods have been used to measure attraction to, and satisfaction with group membership.[4]

There are difficulties, however, with this conceptualization. The most important centers around the problem of operationalizing the "total field of forces."[5] In addition, there is also the further problem of applying the conceptualization to political systems. For example, one method of measuring attractiveness to a group is simply to measure the degree of ease, or difficulty, with which a member can be induced to leave the group. Clearly this applies only in the

slightest degree to political systems, where the forces against leaving are stronger than in small, voluntary groups. Other methods of measurement likewise are not directly applicable to political systems.

The problem with using the nation state as the unit of analysis lies not with formulating a new conceptualization of cohesiveness. We can speak of national states as having intrinsic and extrinsic values which attract and repel members in varying degrees. Rather the problem lies with the operationalization of the term in a way applicable to such a large, complex group as a political system. A new method of doing this is proposed and discussed in the next chapter.

Functions of External Threats

Many theorists have put forth the proposition that, when threatened from the outside, the cohesiveness of a group will tend to increase. Perhaps the first person to be seriously concerned with this notion was the German sociologist Georg Simmel, who, near the turn of the century, wrote:

> The group in a state of peace can permit antagonistic members within it to live with one another in an undecided situation because each of them can go his own way and can avoid collisions. A state of conflict, however, pulls the members so tightly together and subjects them to such uniform impulse

> that they must either get completely along with, or completely repel, one another. This is the reason why war with the outside is sometimes the last chance for a state ridden with inner antagonisms to overcome these antagonisms, or else to break up definitely.[6]

Subsequent theorists have made similar formulations. Irving Janis says that when people are exposed to external danger they show a remarkable increase in group solidarity.[7] Sherif showed in a classic experiment with school-age children that conflict between groups tends to produce an increase in solidarity within groups.[8] Robert North asserts that the assumption is not uncommon, indeed, that "peace within and conflict without" are essential characteristics of group life.[9] Robin Williams proposes that, "given a social group which is a 'going concern,' a sensed outside threat to the group as a whole will result in heightened internal cohesion."[10] And Lewis Coser, who has written an entire book on the functions of social conflict, maintains that if a group with basic consensus regarding its preservation engages in outside conflict, internal cohesion is likely to be increased.[11]

The reasons why groups exhibit greater cohesiveness in the face of external danger are undoubtedly manifold. First, it can easily be argued that when

confronted with external danger a group must band together to resist the danger, especially if the intensity of the danger threatens the existence of the group. As Coser says:

> . . . just because the struggle concentrates the group's energies for the purpose of self-defense, it ties the members more closely to each other and promotes group integration.[12]

Similarly, Simmel states that:

> Groups in any sort of war situations are not tolerant. They cannot afford individual deviations from the unity of the coordinating principle beyond a definitely limited degree.[13]

The point here is that external conflict leads to the mobilization of the energies of group members and hence to an increase in the cohesion of the group.

One can also distinguish psychological reasons for increased cohesiveness. According to Freud's theory of group behavior, emotional bonds established between each member and the leaders are responsible for much of the motivation for group solidarity.[14] Freud speaks of "transference" reactions toward the idealized leader who, as a parent surrogate, provides the main impetus for sharing common ideals and standards of conduct.[15] In time of severe danger to the group, certain regressive features of unconscious transference reactions toward authority figures become overt. Thus, in times

of extreme external danger, emotional bonds between group members and the leader will strengthen with the result of bringing greater in-group solidarity.

As another psychological aspect, Janis speaks of

> . . . additional needs for reassurance that are directly stimulated by external danger and that are satisfied through interaction with fellow members of the primary group.[16]

Citing morale surveys during World War II, he concludes that external threats foster increased reliance on the group by arousing a variety of basic psychological needs for reassurance, some of which are preconscious, or unconscious.[17] Thus, closer identification with the group provides an emotional relief (at least temporarily) from the fear and anxiety caused by the danger.

External threats can also be thought to increase group cohesion by bringing members together who had previously not interacted. This is functional for increased cohesiveness since antagonisms and fissures existent within a group may be overcome as the members interact in the face of the external threat. Moreover, by creating a new situation, which is partly or totally undefined by rules and norms, the external danger acts as a stimulus for the establishment of rules and norms. According to Coser:

> Conflict acts as a stimulus for establishing new rules, norms, and institutions, thus serving as an agent of socialization . . . . Furthermore, conflict reaffirms dormant norms and thus intensifies participation in social life.[18]

This function is of particular importance to groups lacking general consensus with respect to norms, values, and goals, since the external danger may serve to establish a unifying bond upon which further unity can be built. The notions of induced interaction and the establishment of new rules and norms are more directly relevant to the long-term effects of external threats on group cohesiveness.

External threats do not have to be objectively present in order to foster group cohesion; all that is required is that the members perceive that a threat exists. As Coser points out:

> Threats may or may not exist in objective reality, but the group must feel that they do. Social perception of an outside threat may be distorted, but its effect on the in-group may be the same as that of undistorted perception of objective threat.[19]

It follows, then, that if external threats, both real and imaginary, are functional for in-group cohesiveness, it would behoove leaders to search for, or "invent," "threats." Simmel implies this notion when he says that:

> Within certain groups, it may be a piece of political wisdom to see to it that there be some enemies in order for the unity of the members to remain effective and for the group to remain conscious of this unity as its vital interest.[20]

Similarly, Coser asserts that:

> Searching for an outside enemy (or exaggeration of the danger which an actual enemy represents) serves not only to maintain the structure of the group, but also to strengthen its cohesion when threatened by a relaxation of enemies or by internal dissension. Sharpness of outside conflict receives the alertness of the membership, and either reconciles divergent tendencies or leads to concerted group action against the dissenter.[21]

A leader may, then, search for an enemy when the internal situation within his group calls for it. More specifically, when the unity of his group is for some reason threatened, the leader may divert attention away from the internal situation by inventing or exaggerating an external threat, providing, of course, that the "threat" is perceived by a sufficient number of group members.[22] The threat may thus function to increase cohesion by reviving the alertness of the membership and reconciling divergent tendencies, and by diverting members' attention from internal problems, thereby providing the leader valuable time to deal with them. The leader may thus gain an aura of legitimacy that he normally would not enjoy, by creating a threatening

condition, and thereby profiting from members' "transference reactions" toward his authority.

External threats are not invented or exaggerated only in times of internal troubles within the group. The leaders may see to it that threats are continually present. In this regard it may be dysfunctional to alleviate an existing threat, providing that it does not threaten the existence or well-being of the group. According to Simmel:

> A group's complete victory over its enemies is not always fortunate in the sociological sense. Victory lowers the energy which guarantees the unity of the group: and the dissolving forces (anti-cohesive), which are always at work, gain hold.[23]

The contemporary example of newly independent nations illustrates this point. While African or Asian leaders can, and do, gain considerable integrative value from the "threats" of colonialism and neocolonialism, if all vestiges of these threats were to disappear, it is unlikely that the leaders could count on the level of internal loyalty that they enjoy today.[24]

The use of invented and exaggerated threats by leaders is a frequent practice in authoritarian regimes, such as the Communist countries and the Fascist states before World War II. In such systems, scapegoats are institutionalized, and the rank-and-file

dissatisfactions can be diverted by the elite against "internal" and "external" enemies, thus enhancing cohesion.[25] Examples would be the scapegoat role played by the Jews for Nazi Germany, and Western imperialists for the Communist states.

Dysfunctions of External Threats

Thus far our concern has been with the positive functions of external threats. But do external threats always lead to increased cohesion, or does this happen only under a specific set of circumstances? This question is crucial to the theoretical formulation of the threat-cohesion relationship.

There is common agreement among social theorists that external threats are not necessarily functional. On the one hand, external threats may strengthen existing ties, but, on the other hand, they may result in the destruction or disruption of all or some of the bonds of unity.[26] Threats can also lead to what Simmel alludes to, and Coser calls, anomie. What conditions, then, determine how groups will be affected by outside threats?

According to Coser, the degree of group consensus prior to the outbreak of conflict seems to be the most

important factor affecting cohesion. "If a group is lacking in basic consensus, outside threat leads not to increased cohesion, but to general apathy, and the group is consequently threatened with disintegration."[27] If we assume that a lack of basic group consensus is a good indicator of lack of cohesion, then a threshold level of pre-threat cohesion can be postulated. That is, groups above the threshold level will become more cohesive when externally threatened; and groups below the level will tend to become less cohesive. Coser lends support to this postulate:

> The relation between outer conflict and inner cohesion does not hold true where internal cohesion before the outbreak of the conflict is so low that the group members have ceased to regard preservation of the group as worthwhile, or actually see the outside threat to concern "them" rather than "us." In such cases disintegration of the group, rather than increase in cohesion will be the result of the external conflict.[28]

The case of Britain and France during World War II provides a good illustration here. While the internal cohesion in Britain increased with the Nazi attack, in France internal fissures were widened to the point of a breakdown in consensus even concerning the most basic question of all; whether France was to continue as an independent national unit.[29]

The actual effects of outside threats, however, may not be so simple as implied here; one must also consider the nature of the threat. Although there is little literature on this subject, it seems that one must also speak of a threshold level of external threat; above which the threat will be of sufficient intensity that the group members will feel affected by it, and below which it will not be commonly recognized. Just how these two thresholds--cohesion and external threat--operate with respect to one another is not certain. What will be the effect, for example, of a threat below the threshold level of intensity on a group whose general level of cohesion is below threshold value?

Intuitively, it would seem that low intensity external threats, since they probably will not foster common group perception, will not have any significant effect on the overall cohesiveness of the group. However, in the face of low threats groups may, perhaps, be more aggressive toward the threatening party because they don't fear retribution. External aggression, although it may be wholly verbal, can function as a means for relieving internal group frustrations and tensions, important sources of intra-group conflict.[30]

It should be noted that regardless of the general level of cohesion or the nature and intensity of the threat, groups may become less cohesive in the face of an outside threat if: (1) a likely solution to the threat is not available; (2) alternative solutions to resolving the threat pose themselves; and (3) the threat is not dealt with properly, and group morale consequently declines.[31]

If outside threats are to be integrative, it is important that high morale be maintained within the threatened group. Closely related to cohesiveness, morale, or esprit de corps, refers to the feelings of group members toward one another and toward the goals for which they jointly strive.[32] The maintenance of high morale is largely a problem for group leaders. The way they deal with external threats is an important factor. For example, if leaders do not clearly state group goals and objectives with regard to a particular external threat, then the morale of the group will likely decline.

Morale is itself a very complex group property, perhaps even more so than cohesion. Daniel Katz corroborates this notion when he suggests that, ". 'morale' as a group-oriented concept is too broad to be

operationally useful."[33] Incorporating morale as a variable in this study is not practical. It would necessitate an entire study in itself, and even then it would be no easy task. Thus for the purposes of this study, we will be content simply to mention morale as a factor which may influence the way in which groups are affected by external threats.

In addition to exhibiting greater or lesser cohesiveness when threatened, groups may follow two other courses: they may become more centralized and coercive, and they may exhibit external aggression.

Both Simmel and Coser speak of a tendency for some groups to become more centralized when threatened, particularly when the threat is serious. Not all groups, however, become more centralized or "despotic."[34] Despotism arises only when there is a need, such as to maintain the existence of the group. Whether or not despotism results from threatening situations is largely dependent upon the degree of cohesion of the social system; the more cohesive, the less the coercion that will have to be employed.[35] Coser is thus saying that although any group can become more coercive when externally threatened, such action is more likely to occur in groups low in cohesion.

Since our chief concern in this study is with the effects of international threats on the cohesiveness of political systems, no detailed effort is made to elaborate on the effects of external threats on coercion, or the effects of coercion on cohesiveness. However, since coercion may be an important intervening variable in the external threat-cohesion relationship, let us outline a few possible relationships.

Permissive countries should not have to resort to coercion to maintain unity when externally threatened since they are likely to be cohesive. Coercive nations, which rely on physically induced cohesion, likewise would probably not have to resort to increased coercion since they are already highly coercive. Since both permissive and coercive nations tend to be cohesive, we can predict that both will become more cohesive when externally threatened. Moderately coercive nations would tend to become less cohesive when externally threatened since they are likely to possess lower levels of cohesiveness.[36]

Threatened nations may also aggress toward the external source of the threat. As a possible intervening variable, it is conceivable that external aggression can strengthen the cohesiveness of political systems, by

serving to enhance feelings of national identity and pride, factors conducive to national cohesion.

We have been referring to the immediate effects of external threats. The long-term effects of international threats are much more difficult to ascertain. This is largely because of the multitude of possible exogenous variables which can mediate and confound the relationship. Although the long-term effects of external threats will not be tested in this study, some theoretical comments regarding their relationship to the short-term effects are in order here.

Intuitively, it would seem that there is a close relationship between the short-term and long-term effects of external threats. More specifically, if an outside threat increases group cohesiveness, in the short run, there is a good possibility that this positive effect will have positive long-term consequences. Simmel acknowledges such a relationship when he says that:

> Unity, while it originates in conflict, and for purposes of conflict, may maintain itself beyond the period of struggle. It [the group] comes to have additional interests and associative forces which no longer have any relation to the initial militant purpose.[37]

Other variables, of course, may also enter into the short run-long run relationship. The presence of alternative or competing solutions to the threat, morale, and the duration and outcome of the threat, would all be important variables to consider.

International threats may also increase "group consciousness," which Coser defines as "the transformation of individuals with their own specific life situations into conscious representatives of the group."[38] Coser proposes that groups become increasingly aware of their identity through conflict and in this way establish or maintain the boundaries between themselves and the outside.[39] With regard to national political systems, enhancing feelings of national consciousness is an important long-term function of external threats.

In accordance with the preceding theoretical discussions, the following hypotheses, using the variables cohesion and external threat, are formulated:

1. If a highly cohesive nation is threatened by a foreign nation, or nations, it will tend to become more cohesive.
2. If a nation low in cohesiveness is threatened by a foreign nation, or nations, it will tend to become less cohesive.

If we add the variable of coerciveness to the external threat-cohesion relationship, we may formulate the following hypotheses:

1. If a highly coercive or permissive nation is externally threatened by a foreign nation, or nations, it will tend to become more cohesive.
2. If a moderately coercive nation is threatened by a foreign nation, or nations, it will tend to become less cohesive.

These are the main hypotheses to be tested in the present study. Others relevant to the external threat-instability relationship are presented in the next chapter.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1]Theodore Newcomb, Ralph Turner, and Phillip Converse, Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 381.

[2]Robert T. Golembiewski, William Welch, and William Crotty, A Methodological Primer for Political Scientists (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1969), p. 69.

[3]For uses of this conceptualization see: L. Festinger, S. Schachter, and K. Back, Social Pressure in Informal Groups (New York: Harper and Row, 1950); Morton Deutsch, "Experimental Study of the Effects of Cooperation and Competition Upon Group Processes," Human Relations, II, No. 3 (1949), 199-232; Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); J. Thibaut and H. H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959); Goodwin Watson, Social Psychology, Issues and Insights (New York: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1966); Morton Deutsch and Robert Krauss, Theories in Social Psychology (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1952); and Theodore Newcomb, et al., op. cit.

[4]No attempt is made in this study to survey such methods. Good summaries of the various methods which have been used to measure cohesion can be found in Golembiewski, et al., op. cit., pp. 67-89; and by Dorwin Cartwright, "The Nature of Group Cohesiveness," in Cartwright and Alvin Zander (eds.), Group Dynamics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 91-109.

[5]Criticism of this conceptualization can be found in Neal Gross and William Martin, "On Group Cohesiveness," American Journal of Sociology, LVII (1952), 546-554; and in Golembiewski, et al., op. cit., pp. 70-71.

[6]Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Intergroup Relations (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1955), pp. 92-93.

[7]Irving L. Janis, "Group Identification Under Conditions of External Danger," in Cartwright and Zander, op. cit., p. 80.

[8]Muzafer Sherif, "The Experiments," in In Common Predicament (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1966).

[9]Robert C. North, et al., "The Integrative Function of Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV (1960), 355.

[10]Robin Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (New York: Social Science Research Council Bulletin, No. 57, 1957).

[11]Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956), pp. 92-93.

[12]Ibid., p. 71.

[13]Simmel, op. cit., p. 93.

[14]Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (London: Hogarth, 1922).

[15]Janis, in Cartwright and Zander, op. cit., p. 82.

[16]Ibid., p. 83.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Coser, op. cit., p. 128.

[19]Ibid., p. 104.

[20]Simmel, op. cit., p. 98.

[21]Coser, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

[22]Exactly what constitutes a "sufficient number" undoubtedly varies from group to group. However, it seems obvious that a majority of group elites, at least, must perceive the threat.

[23]Simmel, op. cit., p. 93.

[24]See Ronald T. Fox, "Nation-State Building and Foreign Policy in the Former Colonial States of Africa," unpublished manuscript, 1969; and I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (New York: Prentice Hall, 1966).

[25]North, et al., op. cit., p. 367.

[26]Ibid., p. 355.

[27]Coser, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

[28]Ibid., p. 93.

[29]Ibid., p. 94.

[30]Some of the best studies dealing with the "frustration-aggression theory" include: John Dollard, et al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949); Norman R. F. Maier, Frustration: The Study of Behavior Without a Goal (New York, Toronto, and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949); Arnold H. Buss, The Psychology of Aggression (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961); Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952); and Elton B. McNeil, "Psychology and Aggression," Journal of Conflict Resolution, III, No. 3 (September, 1959), 195-293.

[31]Robert L. Hamblin, "Group Integration During a Crisis," Human Relations, XI, No. 1 (February, 1958), 75.

[32]Leonard Doob, Social Psychology: An Analysis of Human Behavior (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), p. 227.

[33]Daniel Katz, as quoted by Doob, Ibid., p. 229.

[34]"Despotism" is used by Simmel and Coser to connote absolute, irresponsible and autocratic control.

[35]Coser, op. cit., p. 89.

[36]Theoretical formulations regarding the effects of moderate levels of coercion on behavior within political systems can be found in Robert Levine, "Anti-European Violence in Africa: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, III, No. 4 (1959); and in Ted Gurr and Charles Ruttenburg, The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model (Princeton: University Center for International Studies, 1967), pp. 9-11. See also Jennifer Walton, "Correlations of Coerciveness and Permissiveness of National Political Systems: A Cross-National Study," unpublished Master's thesis, San Diego State College, 1965; and Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "The Relationship of Systemic Frustration, Political Coercion, International Tension and Political Instability: A Cross-Nation Study," paper delivered at meeting of American Psychological Association, New York City, September 2-6, 1966, mimeographed.

[37]Simmel, op. cit., p. 101.

[38]Coser, op. cit., p. 115.

[39]Ibid.

CHAPTER III

PROCEDURES

In order to investigate the hypotheses of this study, the concepts of national cohesion, external threat, and coercion were reduced to measurable dimensions. Once this task was accomplished, the literature was searched for relevant data on the variables. Applicable data were found, and this study includes eighty-three nations for which data were available.

Measurement of the Dependent Variable: National Cohesion

There have been several methods devised to measure cohesion.[1] One approach is to focus on the sources of cohesion, and several sources have been isolated and measured. There is, however, a basic difficulty with this approach. Since there are so many sources, no single index will be totally satisfactory. As Newcomb, et al., observe, "It is probably true that we will better understand a group when we have indices of several of the sources of its cohesiveness than if we put our confidence into a single index."[2] Moreover, even if one could measure the major sources, the problem of combining them into a single measurement would be of

great difficulty. Anyone, alone, could under certain conditions be responsible for very high, or very low, cohesiveness.

In addition to measuring cohesiveness in terms of its sources, one can also index its consequences, although this technique is less frequently used. That is, one can focus on particular behavioral manifestations of groups. There is some experimental evidence that favors this approach. K. W. Back designed an experiment to test, among other things, the proposition that highly cohesive groups will behave similarly, regardless of their sources of cohesion. He found that the effects of cohesion were about the same regardless of variations in its components, thus corroborating the proposition.[3] This is important, since if it is assumed, as Back's findings suggest, that there are more or less standard consequences of cohesiveness, then the degree of group cohesiveness can be adequately indexed in terms of its consequences.

In operationalizing national cohesion, we have chosen to focus on consequences rather than sources, since concentration on the latter would be far too difficult a task, cross-nationally. Although there are undoubtedly several behavioral manifestations of

national cohesion, one, in particular, is common to all nations. This is the amount of conflict that occurs within nations. The reasoning is that the more cohesive the nation, the less citizens will fight among themselves; and the less cohesive the nation, the greater will be the degree of internal conflict.

Some theorists have implied or argued the applicability of group conflict as an indicator of the cohesiveness of a group. Robin Williams says that the greater the differentiation of groups and of individual roles in society (presumably associated with cohesiveness) the greater the probability of group conflict.[4] He also says that the "probability of internal conflict is lowered by the presence of an outside threat which endangers all [members]."[5] Similarly, Huntington contends that an increase in the frequency of inter-state conflict is likely to decrease the frequency of domestic violence.[6]

Following these insights, the degree of cohesiveness of a nation for a specified period of time is defined, for the purposes of this study, as the frequency and intensity of conflict which takes place in the nation during the time period. The cohesiveness of

France in 1957, for example, is indexed by the level of conflict in France for that year.

Conceptualized in this manner, the literature was searched for relevant data, and a collection of internal conflict data amassed by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold was selected. This Data Bank of Political Instability Events includes data on eighty-four countries for the years, 1948-1965.[7] These data were collected from the Yearbooks of the Encyclopedia Britannica and Deadline Data on World Affairs.

The Feierabends and Nesvold indexed political instability by focusing on specific instances of overt political aggression in each of the eighty-four countries. Twenty-nine different items were selected as being representative of all the specific disturbances that occurred in these countries. Since these items differed in degree of seriousness, or intensity, a scaling method was devised based upon a weighting for the level of intensity of aggression denoted by each event.

In weighting the aggressive events, a seven-point scale was employed. The scale continuum ranged from extreme stability, point 0, to extreme instability, point 6. Some typical items appropriate to each scale

level are given below.[8] A complete list of the twenty-nine items and the complete scale is included in Appendix A.

Point 0--indicates extreme political stability. Political processes are carried out in an orderly, routine-like fashion, according to prescribed rules. Orderly general elections are an example of the 0 position on the scale.

Point 1--connotes mild strain on the political system. Events such as the fall of a cabinet, resignation of significant political figure(s), and peaceful demonstrations are examples of events in scale level 1.

Point 2--indicates strain of greater magnitude than in Point 1. A peaceful, but widespread demonstration, a general strike, political arrests and imposition of martial law, would receive a rating of 2.

Point 3--indicates intensified disturbance as compared to items under Point 2. Limited riots, assassinations and executions of significant political leaders would fall within this level.

Point 4--connotes instability clearly present. Examples of events in this scale are widespread riots, mass arrests, assassination of the chief of state, and coup d'état with low violence and low mass involvement.

Point 5--indicates even more intense and widespread disturbance than in Point 4. Coups d'état with some violence and riots, and plots to overthrow the government accompanied by mass arrests and violent activities constitute this category.

Point 6--indicates extreme instability. This level includes the following items: mass executions, civil war, and coups d'état with serious violence and mass involvement.

To obtain national political instability scores, the Feierabends assigned countries to groups on the basis of the most intense instability event they experienced between 1955 and 1961.[9] The groups correspond to positions on the stability rating scale. For example, countries which experienced mass executions or civil war during the time period were placed in group 6; countries experiencing coups d'état with some violence and riots were placed in group 5; and so on. Justification for using this grouping technique was that a political instability score based solely upon a summation of all aggression scale values might distort the picture, by making it possible for a nation to receive a higher instability score as a result of a series of mild events such as demonstrations (scale position 1) than

for a civil war (scale position 6). With the grouped method, the gravity of the instability event is emphasized.

After grouping countries according to their most severe act of internal aggression, a sum total of each country's aggressive event ratings was calculated. Countries were then rank ordered within their respective groupings, according to their sum totals.[10] For example, since all the instability event values in Spain from 1955 to 1961 totaled 63, and the most severe instability event for this time period measured 4, Spain's political instability score was 463.

In adapting the Feierabend measurement for our purposes, three modifications were made. First, whereas they measured instability for the total 1955-1961 period, we chose to measure it on a year-by-year basis as well. This is to allow observation of changes in stability (cohesion) levels. Second, while the Feierabends used three digits for their political instability score, we chose to utilize a four-digit number. This extra digit is to allow a wider range of instability scores, which is also necessary for observation of changes in the variable.

The third modification involves the use of yet a different method of measuring political instability. Although the grouped measurement method has its advantages, it also elicits various problems. Since there is a likelihood that all nations will, at some time, experience some form of intense internal aggression, the longer the time period for which instability is measured, the stronger the probability that all nations will attain high political instability scores. Such a limited range of scores may hinder analysis. Since the grouped method may not provide an acceptable range of political instability scores, the relationship between instability and other variables may be obscured.

Also, using the grouped method, we may be exaggerating the importance of an internal aggression event, by making it possible for a country to be placed in a higher instability level for experiencing one coup d'état with some violence (scale position 5) than for experiencing a long series of widespread riots and mass arrests (scale position 4). For example, a country with one scale 5 coup d'état, and nothing else, would receive an instability score of 5005; a country experiencing fifteen widespread riots would receive a score of only 4060. In such a case, perhaps the sum total of internal

aggression ratings would more accurately reflect a nation's instability level. One also may argue, then, that the frequency of instability events should be given more weight than they receive with the grouped measurement method.

To obtain a measurement of instability which emphasizes frequency over intensity, a summed instability score, devoid of the most intense event digit, is also employed. This method will also yield scores of a broader range than the grouped method.

Thus in this study two methods are utilized to measure instability; the advantages of one are the disadvantages of the other. The two methods complement each other. It will be important to note if results obtained using both methods differ significantly.

In sum, in an effort to measure the cohesiveness of political systems, we have chosen to focus on the frequency and intensity of conflict within nations as an appropriate index. In doing so we have made the crucial assumption that there is a high inverse correlation between political instability and national cohesion; the higher the cohesiveness, the lower the instability.

In this study instability is measured for eighty-three nations of the world for each year, 1955 through 1961, and for this entire time period combined.[11] These country scores are reported in Table I. To obtain the summed scores, one need only drop the initial digit.

Stable and Unstable Countries

In order to test our hypothesis that stable (high cohesive) nations will become more stable (cohesive) when externally threatened, and unstable (low cohesive) nations, less stable, it is necessary to dichotomize countries into stable and unstable groupings. Since political instability may fluctuate greatly over time, the longer the time period for which instability is measured, the more accurate will be the measurement. If a short time period were used, one might be measuring some countries at peak stability, or instability periods, thus giving a less accurate picture of their overall levels of stability. Stability should therefore be measured for the longest time period possible. With the Feierabend and Nesvold data bank, this is the 1948-1965 period.

As already indicated, this longer time period raises problems with both the grouped and summed measurement methods regarding the range of instability

TABLE I

CROSS-NATIONAL INSTABILITY SCORES, 1955-1961

Country	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1955-61
Afghanistan	3003	4006	0000	0000	3005	0000	0000	4014
Albania	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	1002	4019	4021
Argentina	6042	5029	4014	4020	3029	5042	5016	6192
Australia	0000	2003	1001	0000	0000	0000	2005	2009
Austria	1002	1001	0000	2004	1004	3007	2006	3024
Belgium	4011	0000	1002	1007	2004	4013	4018	4055
Bolivia	3003	4008	3009	5023	5014	6018	5034	6109
Brazil	5010	5008	3005	3007	2003	2004	4026	5063
Bulgaria	0000	4006	1001	1001	0000	0000	1003	4011
Burma	1001	4007	5007	5013	4011	4008	4010	5057
Cambodia	1004	1005	4007	1007	4004	1006	1003	4036
Canada	0000	0000	2005	2003	3007	2005	2007	3027
Ceylon	0000	3008	3008	4021	4014	3011	3025	4087
Chile	2012	2007	3009	1001	2003	3009	3014	3055
China (Taiwan)	2003	0000	3005	1003	0000	2008	2004	3023
China (Red)	4005	0000	4013	5019	0000	2003	0000	5040
Columbia	2004	5022	5027	5009	3013	4004	5024	5103
Costa Rica	2002	0000	1001	1001	2002	0000	1001	2007
Cuba	0000	5031	5023	6008	6032	5039	5037	6170
Cyprus	2002	5018	0000	4006	2008	3007	3003	5044
Czechoslovakia	0000	3005	2002	1002	2002	2004	1001	3016
Denmark	1001	4006	0000	1002	0000	1001	2012	4022
Dominican Rep.	2002	4004	0000	0000	4006	4006	4060	4078
East Germany	2002	4008	3005	2003	2002	2003	4031	4054
Ecuador	3009	3006	2002	2002	4011	1001	3016	4047
Egypt	1002	2009	2006	1002	2003	0000	5011	5033
El Salvador	0000	0000	4004	0000	0000	5032	5010	5046
Ethiopia	1001	0000	0000	1001	0000	5005	4006	5013
Finland	1001	2005	2008	1004	1001	1001	1002	2022
France	3015	3005	3016	5029	2009	5090	5101	5265
Greece	0000	4011	0000	1005	0000	2004	2005	4025

TABLE I (continued)

Country	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1955-61
Guatemala	3004	3011	5022	1001	3003	5014	5014	5069
Haiti	0000	2010	5048	5015	4007	2014	5026	5120
Honduras	1001	5018	1002	0000	6016	3009	3003	6049
Hungary	1003	6033	4014	4004	0000	1001	3008	6063
Iceland	2002	1002	0000	1002	1002	0000	2004	2012
India	2005	4015	4040	4040	4016	4039	4044	4199
Indonesia	4013	6034	6050	6024	6018	6049	5015	6203
Iran	4015	2002	2004	4006	1001	3021	3033	4082
Iraq	0000	2008	2010	5029	6053	3010	4016	6126
Ireland	0000	0000	2005	0000	1003	0000	3006	3014
Israel	1001	1002	1002	4006	1002	0000	3009	3022
Italy	2006	0000	1004	2003	2005	4031	4016	4065
Japan	1001	1002	2006	3007	3005	4034	4013	4068
Jordan	4009	3009	5030	2009	4018	4023	5043	5117
Korea	2006	4004	0000	3010	4011	4043	5043	5117
Laos	0000	1001	1002	1002	4024	6022	6008	6059
Lebanon	1001	4010	5026	5062	4007	1006	5010	5122
Liberia	4006	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	3022	4028
Libya	1001	3004	1002	0000	0000	3005	2005	3017
Luxemborg	0000	1001	0000	1005	1001	0000	1001	1008
Malaya	0000	0000	1002	2004	2004	1003	4005	4018
Mexico	3003	3005	0000	3013	2010	4016	4025	4072
Morocco	5039	3013	5014	4015	2005	2004	2014	5104
Netherlands	1001	1003	0000	1003	1001	1001	1002	1011
New Zealand	0000	0000	0000	1002	0000	0000	1001	1033
Nicaragua	4008	4014	0000	4004	4020	5009	5010	5065
Norway	1002	0000	2005	0000	0000	1001	1002	2010
Pakistan	1004	2016	2014	4027	2004	2010	3009	4084
Panama	4009	1001	4005	4010	4016	0000	4007	4048
Paraguay	5014	3004	4004	1001	5023	5011	6015	6072
Peru	3007	5013	3018	3021	2014	1002	2006	5081
Philippines	4005	4004	4006	4008	4005	4008	0000	4036

TABLE I (continued)

Country	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1955-61
Poland	2002	5038	3032	1002	0000	4017	2006	5097
Portugal	0000	1001	2002	2005	5011	2004	3024	5047
Rumania	1002	0000	1003	2007	0000	1001	3007	3020
Saudi Arabia	0000	0000	0000	1001	0000	1002	1002	1005
Spain	1001	3012	3028	2014	4016	4037	4008	4116
Sudan	5008	4018	2007	5019	6039	3007	3004	6102
Sweden	1002	2002	1005	1002	1001	0000	0000	2012
Switzerland	0000	0000	2002	0000	1002	1001	3008	3013
Syria	4013	4014	4017	2008	4010	1001	5023	5083
Thailand	1006	4011	4028	4017	4008	0000	4011	4081
Tunisia	3014	4022	2012	4006	1002	0000	6014	6070
Turkey	4016	1006	3010	2004	4008	5051	4022	5117
Un. of So. Africa	4021	3011	4019	4023	5025	4069	4023	5191
United Kingdom	2011	1001	2011	3009	3010	3007	3017	3066
U. S. A.	1001	2005	3011	3006	3013	3025	3036	3097
Uruguay	0000	1002	4008	3006	2005	2004	3011	4036
U. S. S. R.	1003	4009	3008	1002	4014	1005	4022	4063
Venezuela	1001	2002	4008	5045	4017	5044	5043	5160
West Germany	2006	2006	0000	0000	3003	2003	2005	3023
Yugoslavia	2003	2004	4004	2010	4012	2006	3003	4042
Mean Scores	1824	2405	2286	2358	2466	2434	3160	4185

scores. Using the grouped method, the range would be extremely limited. The summed method would still be insensitive to the gravity of internal aggressive events. The measurement of instability for the entire 1948-1965 period thus had to be modified so that instability scores of acceptable range would be obtained.

This task was accomplished by first summing all instability event ratings for the 1948-1965 period, giving a three-digit number. The 18-year period was then divided into three equal intervals--1948-1953, 1954-1959, and 1960-1965--and the most intense instability event for each country, for each interval, was recorded. These three most intense event scores were then summed, which has the effect of attenuating a high score in one sub-period by a lower score in another sub-period. This method, which yields a five-digit score, develops profiles of acceptable range (see Table II).

In this table countries are rank ordered according to their instability scores for the 1948-1965 period. They were then dichotomized into stable and unstable groupings. The USSR is the last of the stable countries, and the Sudan, the first of the unstable countries. This dichotomy yields forty-one stable and forty-two unstable nations.

TABLE II

POLITICAL INSTABILITY PROFILES OF EIGHTY-THREE COUNTRIES (1948-1965)

1	2	3	4	5	6
			France 13435		
			U. So. Af. 13422		
			Brazil 13209		
			Morocco 13194		
			Portugal 13190		
			Turkey 13189		
			Poland 13179		
			Thailand 13152		
			Jordan 13145		
			Cyprus 13123	Argent. 16445	
			Hungary 13113	Bolivia 16318	
			Philipp. 13105	Cuba 16283	
			Czech. 13100	Iraq 16274	
			China (M) 13086	Colomb. 16244	
			Cambodia 13071	Burma 16213	
			India 12360	Venez. 15429	
		Belgium 10162	Iran 12237	Syria 15329	
		Chile 10156	Pakistan 12231	Korea 15291	
		Mexico 10111	Sudan 12189	Haiti 15205	
	U. K. 07112	Uruguay 10100	USSR 12165	Peru 15196	
	Austria 07057	Israel 10064	Ecuador 12117	Greece 14236	
	Denmark 07030	Liberia 10036	Nicaragua 12096	Guatem. 14234	
	Iceland 07026	Ethiopia 10034	USA 11318	Lebanon 14212	
	W. Ger. 06087	Italy 09192	Spain 11284	Egypt 14152	
	Finland 06056	Libya 09069	Dom. Rep. 11195	Parag. 14141	
	Taiwan 06039	Romania 09060	Ceylon 11152	E. Ger. 14138	
	Austral. 06026	Costa Rica 09058	Japan 11123	Laos 14129	
	Sweden 06020	Afghan. 09029	Malaya 11108	Tunisia 14126	
	Ireland 05031	Canada 08084	Yugosl. 11077	Hondur. 14105	
Netherl. 04021	S. Arab. 05018	Switzer. 08042	Bulgaria 11071	Panama 14101	
Luxembg. 03012	N. Zeal. 05015	Norway 08034	Albania 11067	El Salv. 14079	Indon. 18416

Stability ← → Instability

With respect to stable and unstable nations, let us now rephrase relevant hypotheses to be tested in this study.

1. Stable countries will tend to become more stable when threatened by a foreign nation, or nations. In other words, a negative correlation between external threat and instability is postulated for the stable countries.
2. Unstable countries will tend to become less stable when threatened by a foreign nation, or nations. In other words, a positive correlation between external threat and instability is postulated for the unstable nations.

To test these hypotheses, the stable and unstable groupings are examined separately to ascertain the relationship between external threat and political instability.

Measurement of the Independent Variable: External Threat

A threat is commonly interpreted as an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage. With this interpretation, an international threat could be

thought of as any official diplomatic communication or government statement asserting that if a particular country (or group of countries) does or does not act in a particular manner, then it will incur an injurious, or potentially injurious act.

This conceptualization, however, is too limited for our purposes, since it confines threats to official verbal ultimata. Is not a nation still threatened after the threatened action is taken? For example, if the threatened action is an economic boycott, is not the boycotted nation still threatened after the boycott has begun? (The economy is now threatened.) If war breaks out after repeated threats, aren't all warring nations still threatened? The point is that a broader conceptualization of international threat is needed; one that transcends verbal expressions to include any type of threatening situation, both verbal and substantive.

For our purposes, an international threat is conceptualized as any act perpetrated by a nation, or group of nations, which threatens basic values and interests of another nation, or nations. Operationally, a country is considered threatened when it is the target of an aggressive act perpetrated by a foreign country, or countries.[12] Thus by measuring the aggressive acts

directed toward a particular state, a measure of how externally threatened that state is will be obtained. Operationalized in this manner, the term has more general meaning than is normally ascribed to it in the field of international relations.

The literature was searched for a data source which measured external aggression cross-nationally. There have been several investigators who have approached this problem.[13] The data bank amassed by John Chambers was selected since it has the following advantages: the same eighty-four nations which are included in the instability bank are also included in the Chambers external aggression bank, and the target countries of external aggression (i.e., the threatened countries) can be ascertained in the data.

Chambers measured external aggression in a manner quite similar to the Feierabend and Nesvold measurement of internal aggression. He distinguished sixteen types of external aggressive actions and placed them on a continuum ranging from mild cases of external aggression, such as diplomatic protests, to extreme examples, such as war. Specifically, the forty-one items were arranged on a seven-point scale. Some items typical of

each scale level are given below;[14] the complete list is given in Appendix B.

Point 1--connotes mild hostility, mild strain in international relations. Diplomatic protests, warnings, and accusations are examples of items in this scale position.

Point 2--indicates a rising level of hostility. Items typical of Point 2 are: specific and semi-specific threats of negative sanctions; small-scale anti-foreign demonstrations; and suspension or interruption of diplomatic relations.

Point 3--connotes diplomatic actions of increasing severity, undertaken with popular consensus. Large anti-foreign demonstrations, withdrawal of foreign aid, and negative economic sanctions are examples of items at this scale level.

Point 4--indicates an even more intense level of hostility than Point 3. Some typical items in this category would be recall or expulsion of ambassador(s), severance of diplomatic relations, total boycott, total embargo, and partial mobilization.

Point 5--connotes a magnitude of hostility in which war is expected. Full military mobilization,

presence of military action on a relatively small scale, and partial blockade are examples of this category.

Point 6--indicates more intense and widespread hostility than Point 5. This scale level includes military action on an intermediate scale.

Point 7--connotes the utmost point of hostility between nations. Presence of military action on a large scale, declaration of war, and total blockade are included at this scale level.

With this rating scale, and using Deadline Data on World Affairs as a data source, Chambers measured external aggression for eighty-four nations for the 1955-1961 period.[15] To obtain external threat scores, we simply recorded all instances of external aggression directed toward each of the eighty-three countries included in this study. In measuring external threat, the same two methods which were used to measure instability were employed: a grouped method, utilizing the most intense threatening event as the first digit, and a summed score, representing a summed total of all threatening events for the time period in question. The same reasoning given for the use of both methods for the instability measurement applies to external threats. Table III gives the complete external threat grouped

TABLE III

CROSS-NATIONAL EXTERNAL THREAT GROUPED SCORES, 1955-1961

Country	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1955-61
Afghanistan	4002	1001	0000	0000	0000	1003	6018	6044
Albania	0000	0000	5007	2004	4011	1003	4034	5059
Argentina	1002	0000	0000	4006	4004	1005	5009	5026
Australia	0000	0000	0000	3003	1001	0000	0000	3004
Austria	0000	0000	1001	0000	2004	4011	2007	4023
Belgium	0000	0000	1001	0000	0000	4026	3026	4053
Bolivia	0000	0000	0000	0000	1001	2002	0000	2003
Brazil	0000	0000	0000	0000	1001	1001	0000	1002
Bulgaria	1004	4004	1001	1002	1001	3007	1003	4022
Burma	0000	5010	0000	0000	0000	0000	5008	5018
Cambodia	0000	0000	0000	3014	0000	0000	1004	3018
Canada	1001	0000	0000	3007	0000	3006	0000	3014
Ceylon	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000
Chile	1001	0000	0000	3003	0000	1001	1001	3006
China (Taiwan)	5015	5014	5005	5043	2003	3007	5012	5099
China (Peking)	5006	5024	5010	5037	5037	4046	5036	5196
Colombia	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	1001	1001
Costa Rica	6022	0000	0000	4004	1001	1001	0000	6028
Cuba	4008	0000	1001	2002	5029	5135	4076	5251
Cyprus	0000	3003	0000	4004	1001	3007	0000	4015
Czechoslovakia	0000	0000	4009	0000	3009	1002	3013	4033
Denmark	0000	0000	1002	3006	3005	0000	1001	3014
Dominican Rep.	2002	0000	1003	4004	4020	4069	4011	4109
East Germany	0000	1001	0000	0000	2005	3020	4008	4034
Ecuador	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	1005	0000	1005
Egypt	6044	6128	3030	4005	3008	2007	5014	6236
El Salvador	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	1002	0000	1002
Ethiopia	0000	0000	1001	0000	0000	0000	1001	1002
Finland	0000	0000	0000	4009	3003	0000	2004	4016
France	4008	5083	5037	5047	4009	6085	5049	6318
Greece	4021	1001	2006	0000	3009	3003	3006	4046

TABLE III (continued)

Country	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1955-61
Guatemala	0000	0000	0000	4006	0000	1007	1002	4015
Haiti	0000	0000	2003	0000	5006	3003	2002	5014
Honduras	0000	0000	4004	4004	0000	1001	5006	5015
Hungary	1001	7034	4007	1001	5005	4005	0000	7053
Iceland	0000	0000	2003	4010	1001	0000	0000	4014
India	2004	1002	1001	1001	5023	1001	6032	6064
Indonesia	1001	0000	0000	4015	1001	5024	5011	5052
Iran	1004	1001	1002	1001	4022	1004	4004	4038
Iraq	0000	3006	1001	4004	4020	3007	4010	4048
Ireland	0000	0000	0000	1001	1001	0000	2004	2006
Israel	6063	6104	5033	6009	5033	5038	1002	6282
Italy	0000	1001	2002	3011	4011	3011	1005	4041
Japan	0000	2002	3006	3020	3012	3024	4008	4072
Jordan	3003	6022	5023	4005	0000	2007	4005	6065
Korea	0000	0000	1001	0000	1001	1001	3007	3010
Laos	1001	0000	1001	0000	1002	3009	1002	3015
Lebanon	0000	5005	1003	4007	5005	0000	0000	5020
Liberia	0000	0000	0000	4004	0000	0000	1001	4005
Libya	0000	0000	1002	1001	0000	1001	0000	1004
Luxembourg	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000
Malaya	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	1001	0000	1001
Mexico	0000	0000	0000	3006	1002	1003	1001	3012
Morocco	0000	3003	6034	1001	0000	6012	4006	6056
Netherlands	3003	4019	3022	0000	0000	5031	5028	5103
New Zealand	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000
Nicaragua	6021	0000	3005	0000	5005	0000	5008	6039
Norway	0000	0000	1001	0000	4007	3009	1001	4018
Pakistan	3022	1004	3005	3004	5010	3011	6027	6083
Panama	0000	3005	0000	4004	0000	4004	1002	4015
Paraguay	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	1001	5005	5006
Peru	1002	0000	0000	3003	1001	4008	0000	4014
Philippines	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000

TABLE III (continued)

Country	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1955-61
Poland	0000	4013	3003	2004	0000	0000	2002	4022
Portugal	4016	1001	2004	0000	0000	1002	6044	6067
Rumania	0000	4010	1001	0000	1002	0000	0000	4013
Saudi Arabia	3003	1001	1004	1001	0000	0000	1001	3010
Spain	2003	0000	6023	3012	0000	4013	3007	6058
Sudan	3005	0000	3003	4011	0000	0000	0000	4019
Sweden	0000	0000	1001	1001	1001	0000	0000	1003
Switzerland	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	1002	0000	1002
Syria	5010	3010	5057	6012	5008	0000	5012	6119
Thailand	0000	0000	0000	3005	0000	3003	5014	5022
Tunisia	0000	1001	5011	5030	0000	4008	5012	5062
Turkey	2004	1002	5023	3003	1001	1002	4013	5048
Un. of So. Africa	0000	0000	0000	3003	1001	4034	4019	4057
United Kingdom	4031	6079	5022	4027	1002	4031	4046	6238
United States	3015	5042	3039	4057	3033	5185	3085	5436
Uruguay	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	1001	1001	1002
U. S. S. R.	4022	7080	2020	4027	4029	4093	4142	7413
Venezuela	0000	0000	4008	4004	4010	1002	3003	4027
West Germany	0000	1001	4019	3003	3011	4033	4030	4097
Yugoslavia	1001	3007	4009	3010	3006	4009	1003	4045
Mean Scores	1246	1406	1693	2115	1704	1989	2397	3148

scores for the eighty-three nations, for each year, 1955-1961, and for the entire period combined.

Measurement of Control Variables

In addition to testing previously stated hypotheses, to explore further the dynamics of the external-threat-instability relationship, the total universe of polities was divided into various clusters. Each cluster corresponds to a relatively homogeneous property of nations. The ones investigated are: coercive, moderately coercive, and permissive nations; modern, transitional, and traditional nations; and sociocultural groupings (West European, Anglo-Saxon, East European, Asian, and Latin American).

Coercion. We have hypothesized that permissive and coercive nations will tend to become more cohesive when externally threatened, and that moderately coercive nations will tend to become less cohesive. In order to test these hypotheses, some method was needed to reduce the permissiveness-coerciveness variable to an empirical, measurable dimension. This task has been pursued by Jennifer Walton who operationalized permissiveness-coerciveness by constructing an ordinal, six-point scale which rates countries from most permissive (scale

position 1) to most coercive (scale position 6) for the 1948-1960 period.[16] Levels of intermediate intensity are scaled somewhere between these two extremes. Specific indicators associated with each scale level are given in Appendix C.

In constructing this six-point scale, Walton used the following questions as guidelines.

1. To what degree are civil rights present and protected?
2. To what extent is political opposition tolerated and effective?
3. How democratic is the polity?[17]

With reference to these questions, the coercion scale was constructed and applied to the same sample of eighty-four nations used in the measurement of instability and external threat. Approximately five separate works on each nation were consulted before an overall judgment was made.[18]

To obtain the coerciveness clusters, these nations were trichotomized into permissive countries (scale positions 1 and 2); moderately coercive countries (scale positions 3 and 4); and coercive countries (scale positions 5 and 6). The resultant clusters and country

profiles on the permissive-coercive dimension are given in Table IV.

By examining the relationship between external threat and instability for each of these clusters separately, we can ascertain whether nations of differing levels of coerciveness are differentially affected by external threats. Let us restate relevant hypotheses concerning the influence of coercion in the external threat-instability relationship.

1. If nations with coercive or permissive political systems are threatened by a foreign nation, or nations, they will tend to become more stable.
2. If nations with moderately coercive political systems are threatened by a foreign nation, or nations, they will tend to become less stable.

To explore further the influence of coerciveness, we should also determine whether coercion increases with external threat, and, if so, if this increased coercion in turn affects stability. To investigate this possibility, coercion was measured on a year-by-year basis, from 1955-1961. To obtain the measurement, we made use of the internal aggressive events, isolating those

TABLE IV

COERCIVE-PERMISSIVE SCALING OF NATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS*

Country	Rank	Country	Rank
Permissive n = 21			
Australia	1	Bolivia	4
Canada	1	Colombia	4
Denmark	1	Cyprus	4
Netherlands	1	Ecuador	4
Norway	1	El Salvador	4
Sweden	1	Guatemala	4
Switzerland	1	Honduras	4
United Kingdom	1	Indonesia	4
United States	1	Iran	4
		Iraq	4
Belgium	2	Jordan	4
Costa Rica	2	Laos	4
Finland	2	Lebanon	4
Iceland	2	Liberia	4
Ireland	2	Libya	4
Israel	2	Peru	4
Italy	2	Sudan	4
Luxembourg	2	Syria	4
Mexico	2	Thailand	4
New Zealand	2	Tunisia	4
West Germany	2		
Uruguay	2	High Coercive n = 27	
Moderately Coercive n = 35		Afghanistan	5
		Argentina	5
Austria	3	Cuba	5
Brazil	3	Egypt	5
Burma	3	Ethiopia	5
Cambodia	3	Haiti	5
Ceylon	3	Korea	5
Chile	3	Morocco	5
France	3	Nicaragua	5
Greece	3	Paraguay	5
India	3	Portugal	5
Japan	3	Saudi Arabia	5
Malaya	3	Spain	5
Pakistan	3	Union of South Africa	5
Panama	3	Venezuela	5
Philippines	3		
Turkey	3		

TABLE IV (continued)

Country	Rank	Country	Rank
Albania	6	Hungary	6
Bulgaria	6	Poland	6
China	6	Romania	6
Czechoslovakia	6	Taiwan	6
Dominican Republic	6	USSR	6
East Germany	6	Yugoslavia	6

*Based on data collected for the years 1948-1960.

events which involve government initiated action directed against members of the political system. These events, termed coercive events, are: dissolution of legislature; dismissal of significant political figures; government action against specific groups; political arrests; suicides of significant political figure(s); imposition of martial law; political executions, and exiles.

The coercive events were scaled just as they were when used to index political instability. Once scaled, the events were then combined into yearly grouped and summed country coercive event scores, employing the same methodology that was used for the variables of instability and external threat. These yearly coercive event scores can then be compared with the yearly instability and external threat scores to see how the three variables are related. With this technique, we should be able to determine the influence of coercion in the external threat-instability relationship.

Level of modernity. Modernity may be conceptualized as an identifiable position on a continuum that measures change from traditional to modern society. In translating this conceptualization into observational terms, Nesvold combined eight indicators--percentage of

population literate; percentage of population in urban centers; caloric intake per person, per day; GNP per capita, per year; number of newspapers per 1,000 population; number of persons per physician; number of radios per 1,000 population; and percentage of population having telephones--into an overall modernity index.[19] In calculating the index, the raw data scores were transformed into standard scores and a mean standard score was calculated on the basis of available data for each of the eighty-four countries. To be measured, a country had only to report data on at least four of the eight indicators selected. The mean standard score, derived from whatever data were reported, then served as the index of modernity.[20] The modernity index for the eighty-three nations is given in Table V. Nesvold's division of the eighty-three nations into modern, transitional, and traditional categories is also shown in the table.

It is theoretically tenable that both traditional and modern nations tend to be relatively cohesive, while transitional nations tend to be low in cohesion. Whereas values, norms, and beliefs are held in common to a relatively high degree in traditional and modern societies, transitional societies are faced with the

TABLE V

MODERNITY INDEX

Country	Score	Country	Score
Modern n = 24			
United States	2.54	Colombia	- .20
New Zealand	1.91	Lebanon	- .21
Switzerland	1.83	Mexico	- .21
Australia	1.71	Brazil	- .23
Sweden	1.70	Paraguay	- .26
Denmark	1.54	Peru	- .30
United Kingdom	1.51	Turkey	- .36
Canada	1.49	Ecuador	- .37
Norway	1.41	El Salvador	- .40
Iceland	1.26	Nicaragua	- .40
Luxembourg	1.07	Ceylon	- .41
Belgium	.94	Guatemala	- .41
Ireland	.93	Dominican Republic	- .46
Netherlands	.89	Honduras	- .46
Finland	.81	Egypt	- .47
France	.80	Korea	- .49
Austria	.61	Syria	- .49
West Germany	.59	Thailand	- .49
Argentina	.57	Tunisia	- .49
East Germany	.50		
Uruguay	.47	Traditional n = 22	
Israel	.46		
USSR	.40	Morocco	- .50
Czechoslovakia	.34	Philippines	- .50
		Burma	- .53
Transitional n = 37		Taiwan	- .53
		Jordan	- .54
Hungary	.24	Bolivia	- .56
Japan	.20	Iraq	- .57
Bulgaria	.19	Ethiopia	- .60
Poland	.19	Iran	- .62
Rumania	.12	China	- .65
Italy	.11	India	- .70
Cuba	.10	Malaya	- .73
Chile	.07	Haiti	- .74
Costa Rica	.03	Libya	- .77
Panama	.01	Pakistan	- .87
Spain	.00	Afghanistan	- .97
Union of South Africa	-.04	Saudi Arabia	- .98
Cyprus	-.05	Indonesia	-1.13
Greece	-.06	Laos	-1.25
Yugoslavia	-.09	Sudan	-1.37
Albania	-.10	Cambodia	-1.46
Venezuela	-.10	Liberia	-1.62
Portugal	-.16		

problem of accommodating and assimilating traditional with modern culture. Their domestic situation is in limbo between tradition and modernity and there is little commonality. It would be expected, then, that the modern and traditional countries will be stable, and the transitional countries, unstable. This hypothesis was tested and partially corroborated by Nesvold. Modern countries were found to be stable, but traditional nations were almost as unstable as transitional ones (see Table VI).[21]

With respect to the external threat-political instability relationship, it is hypothesized that modern nations will show decreased instability when externally threatened, and that transitional nations will show increased instability. The behavior of traditional societies is more difficult to predict. Intuitively, it would seem that they could exhibit increased instability when externally threatened, since the threats would perhaps function to upset the status quo, and catalyze potentially disruptive change. The addition of the modernity variable, then, yields the following hypotheses:

1. <u>If a modern nation is threatened by a foreign nation, or nations, it will tend to become more stable.</u>

TABLE VI

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MODERNITY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Modernity level	N	Mean instability score*
Modern countries	24	268
Transitional countries	37	472
Traditional countries	23	420
Total	84	387

*This represents a grouped mean instability score.

2. If a transitional nation is threatened by a foreign nation, or nations, it will tend to become less stable.

3. If a traditional nation is threatened by a foreign nation, or nations, it will tend to become less stable, but to a lesser degree than the transitional nations.

To test these hypotheses, the modern, transitional, and traditional countries are analyzed separately to ascertain differential effects of external threat and stability.

Sociocultural patterns. A sociocultural variable is used in order to determine whether the effects of external threats vary for different sociocultural groupings. Using factor analysis of fifty-four socio-economic and cultural variables, Russett distinguished five basic dimensions along which polities vary. He then divided nations into five essentially regional clusters according to their sociocultural homogeneity with respect to these dimensions.[22] By these procedures, Russett classified polities into six sociocultural sets: Asian, East European, African, Latin American, Anglo Saxon, and Western European. These clusters are not identical with those which can be

distinguished solely on geographical or cultural lines, but have the advantage of representing groups of polities determined with reference to a large number of relevant variables.[23] Table VII gives the sociocultural groupings for the eighty-three nations used in this study.

No specific hypotheses are set down here with respect to the sociocultural cluster. It is expected, however, that in Latin America and Asia--those areas where instability is high--countries will tend to exhibit increased instability when threatened. To control for the sociocultural variable, the relationship between external threat and instability is ascertained for each sociocultural grouping except the African, which was omitted since it encompassed only three nations from our sample.

Techniques of Analysis

To determine whether external threats are related to instability, the correlation coefficient is the most useful descriptive device. The purpose of the correlation coefficient is both to quantify the form of the relationship, positive or negative, and the degree to which one variable is a predictor of the other, as interpreted from the magnitude of the correlation.

TABLE VII

SOCIOCULTURAL GROUPINGS

Asian	Latin Amer.	Anglo-Saxon	West Europe	East Europe
Afghanistan[a]	Argentina[a]	Australia	Austria	Albania
Burma	Bolivia	Canada	Belgium	Bulgaria
Cambodia[a]	Brazil	Finland[b]	Denmark	China-Peking
Ceylon	Chile	New Zealand	Egypt	Czechoslov.
China-Taiwan[a]	Colombia	Norway[b]	France	East Germany
Haiti	Costa Rica	So. Africa	W. Germany	Hungary
India	Cuba	Sweden[b]	Greece	Poland
Indonesia	Dom. Repub.	USA	Iceland[c]	Rumania
Iran	Ecuador		Ireland	USSR
Iraq	El Salvador	N = 8	Israel	Yugoslavia
Jordan	Guatemala		Italy	
Korea (So.)	Honduras		Japan	N = 10
Laos[a]	Mexico		Lebanon	
Libya[a]	Nicaragua		Luxembourg[c]	
Malaya	Panama		Netherlands	
Morocco	Paraguay		Portugal	
Pakistan	Peru		Spain	
Philippines[a]	Uruguay		Switzerland	
Saudi Arab.[a]	Venezuela		United King.	
Syria				
Thailand	N = 19		N = 19	
Tunisia				
Turkey				
N = 24				

[a]Not included or unclassified in original source; assigned to cluster by Gurr on judgmental grounds or by use of comparable data (Gurr, op. cit., p. 23).

[b]"Anglo-Saxon" may be a misnomer for a cluster that includes three of the four Scandinavian countries but not the United Kingdom. Whatever the label, however, the analysis clearly distinguishes this cluster from the "Western European" cluster (Gurr, op. cit.).

[c]Not included or unclassified in either the Russett or Gurr studies; assigned to cluster on judgmental grounds.

In computing correlations it was decided to use the Pearson product moment formula. Use of the Pearson *r* presupposes that all measures of dependent and independent variables form an interval scale, are normally distributed, and that the relationships are linear. These assumptions cannot be made about our data. The instability and external threat variables must be assumed to be ordinally scaled, since the events themselves are ordinally scaled. However, it is not felt that this unequivocally limits our analysis to the ordinal level. As Gurr observes:

> Statistical procedures that require intervally scaled data are repeatedly used for analyzing ordinal and dichotomous data in the social sciences, typically on the grounds that to do otherwise would be to forego analysis.[24]

Our data are ordinal not because of the particular technique or sources used, but because not enough is known about the variables to be able to assume interval properties. As an exploratory endeavor, then, we feel justified in using interval level statistics. Subsequent research with, and improvement of these variables will enable more objective interval assumptions.

We wish, however, to go further in this study than simply showing an interrelationship between external threat and instability. Since it has been

postulated that international threats will cause changes in the stability (cohesiveness) of nations, we must demonstrate that there is a causal relationship operating, if we are to test the theory adequately. In meeting this problem, it must be shown that external threats, as causes, do, in fact, precede the instability they affect. It must also be shown that other variables are not confounding the causal relationship between external threat and political instability, thus making the relationship spurious.

To help meet the first problem, a one-year time-lag between independent and dependent variable measures was built into the research design, in addition to correlations between the two measures calculated for the same year. This was done to guarantee that external threats would precede instability in a temporal sequence. Thus international threats in 1955 were correlated with instability in 1955 and 1956; threats in 1956, with instability in 1956 and 1957; and so on. Only a one-year time-lag was used, since it was felt that a longer lag would separate the effect from its cause by too great a distance to be meaningful within the limits of this design. With a longer time-lag, there would be an increase in the number of exogenous

variables which would have to be accounted for, thus making interpretation of the findings more difficult. Table VIII shows the various year intervals for which correlations were calculated.

In approaching the problem of possible confounding of variables, we have chosen to focus on only two--coerciveness and external aggression. We have elaborated on the possible influence of coerciveness; external aggression requires further discussion.

Several researchers have found that external threat is rather closely related to external aggression. That is, those countries which are highly threatened tend also to be highly aggressive in the international arena. Chambers, for example, found the rank order correlation coefficient between targets and initiators of external aggression to be $p = .87$.[25] Thus, since external threat and external aggression are closely related, external aggression may be confounding the external threat-instability relationship.

To assess the role of external aggression and the coerciveness of political systems on the proposed relationship, hypothetical causal models were developed, consistent with theoretical formulations. From these models, partial correlations and differences in degree

TABLE VIII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: SIMULTANEOUS AND TIME-LAGGED TIME INTERVALS

Simultaneous Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	
1956	1956	
1957	1957	
1958	1958	
1959	1959	
1960	1960	
1961	1961	

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	
1956	1957	
1957	1958	
1958	1959	
1959	1960	
1960	1961	

Total Time Period:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	

of fit were calculated to determine the influence of both variables on the relationship between external threat and change in stability.

Other variables, such as morale and perception of external threats might also be influential in the external threat-instability relationship. However, because of time and cost limitations, the inclusion of such additional variables in this design was not practical. The possible influence of exogenous factors on the findings is discussed in the concluding chapter.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1]Refer to footnote 4, Chapter II.

[2]Theodore Newcomb, Ralph Turner, and Philip Converse, Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 386.

[3]Ibid., pp. 382-383. Back's experiment first appeared in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVI (1951), 9-23, and has since been repeated in total, and in part, in other works.

[4]Robin Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (New York: Social Science Research Bulletin, No. 57, 1947), p. 56.

[5]Ibid., p. 58.

[6]Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 40-41.

[7]The data are available through the Inter-Nation Consortium for Political Research, University of Michigan.

[8]These examples are taken from the Code Index of the Cross-National Data Bank of Political Instability Events, compiled by Bernice Beagles, Francis Hoole, Norman Litell, and Betty Nesvold, under the directorship of Ivo K. and Rosalind Feierabend.

[9]Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behavior within Polities, 1948-62: A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, X, No. 3 (September, 1966), 249-271.

[10]In pursuing consensual validation, the 29 items were given in an unarranged order to a panel of judges who were asked to arrange the items from extreme stability to extreme instability. Their judgments were compared and found to be intercorrelated (r = .83). The scale was also checked for rater reliability. Two separate ratings were made by independent raters. When

these ratings were compared, they were found to correlate at a high level (r = .953).

[11]We used 83 of the 84 nations in the Feierabend-Nesvold data bank, eliminating Ghana which, since it did not become independent until 1957, had insufficient data for the time period under investigation in this study. The 1955-61 period was selected because, as we shall later see, this is the period for which data on external threats were available.

[12]In the case of external aggressive events of scale level 7, such as war, all nations involved are considered threatened, regardless of who is the actual aggressor.

[13]Rudolph Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," General Systems Yearbook, X (1965); Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-60," Journal of Conflict Resolution, X, No. 1 (March, 1966), 41-65; Frank Scanland, "Systemic Frustration and International Conflict: A Cross-National Study," unpublished Master's thesis, San Diego State College, 1966; John S. Chambers, "Hostility and Amity in International Relations: A Transactional Study," unpublished Master's thesis, San Diego State College, 1966; Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962); and Lewis Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburg: Boxwood Press, 1960).

[14]These typical items are taken from Chambers, Ibid., pp. 45-50, Code Index for Transactional Data Bank of International Hostility-Amity Events.

[15]Although Chambers used only a single source for his data--Deadline Data on World Affairs--he found that derived polity profiles correlated highly (p = .74) with the profiles obtained by Scanland. Since Scanland based his measurement on the data collected by Rummel, who used several sources to measure external aggression for the 1955-60 period, the validity of Chambers' data would seem to be corroborated. (See Chambers, op. cit., p. 60.) Thus although Chambers' polity profiles are derived from a single source of data, it was concluded that the external threat profiles in this study yielded a fairly true picture of the larger universe.

[16]Jennifer Walton, "Correlates of Coerciveness and Permissiveness of National Political Systems: A Cross-National Study," unpublished Master's thesis, San Diego State College, 1965. Data can be obtained through Ivo K. Feierabend, San Diego State College. See also Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "The Relationship of Systemic Frustration, Political Coercion, International Tension and Political Instability: A Cross-National Study," paper delivered for the American Psychological Association meeting in New York City, September 2-6, 1966, mimeographed.

[17]An amplification of these questions may be found in Walton, Ibid., pp. 44-46.

[18]Walton's permissiveness-coerciveness profiles were shown to have construct validity in terms of the criteria used to determine each scale position, to have some consensual validation and corroboration in related studies by other authors, and to be based on some degree of inter-rater reliability. For a more detailed discussion of these data verifications, see Feierabend and Feierabend, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

[19]Nesvold, op. cit., p. 35.

[20]Ibid., p. 44.

[21]Ibid., p. 54.

[22]Ted Gurr and Charles Ruttenburg, The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model (Princeton: University Center for International Studies, 1967), p. 24. Results of the factor analysis are reported in Bruce M. Russett, "International Regions and International Integration: Homogeneous Regions," Draft Manuscript, Yale University, 1965, mimeographed.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., p. 16.

[25]Chambers, op. cit., p. 72.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

The major finding in this study is that there is only a weak relationship between external threat and political instability. This low relationship, however, tends to be predominantly positive. This finding, and others relevant to the relationship between external threat and political instability are reported in this chapter.

External Threat-Political Instability: All Nations

The relationship between external threat and instability for all eighty-three nations is reported in Table IX, using the grouped measurement method, and in Table X, using the summed method. In these tables the relationship between external threat and instability is ascertained for simultaneous years, 1955 through 1961, for years with a one-year time lag, and for the entire 1955-1961 period. As the magnitude of the correlation coefficients in these tables indicate, the relationship is quite small. Low correlations are obtained using both the grouped and summed measurement methods, and for both

TABLE IX

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: ALL NATIONS (GROUPED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 83

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	.092
1956	1956	.065
1957	1957	.054
1958	1958	.161
1959	1959	.024
1960	1960	.114
1961	1961	.233

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.014
1956	1957	.202
1957	1958	.085
1958	1959	.143
1959	1960	.043
1960	1961	.128

Total Time Period:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.284

TABLE X

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: ALL NATIONS (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 83

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	-.053
1956	1956	.008
1957	1957	.121
1958	1958	.126
1959	1959	.148
1960	1960	.319
1961	1961	.312

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.027
1956	1957	.028
1957	1958	.041
1958	1959	.021
1959	1960	.137
1960	1961	.416

Total Time Period:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.251

the simultaneous and time-lagged years. Only one correlation in both tables is at a moderately high level. This is the time-lagged 1960 relationship (r = .416) using the summed method.

Notwithstanding these predominantly low correlations, an interesting pattern does emerge. Nearly all correlations are positive, indicating increased instability in the face of external threat. Of the twenty-eight correlation coefficients appearing in these tables, only four are negative. Hence, if anything, there is a slight tendency for nations to become less stable when threatened by a foreign nation, or nations.

Stable and Unstable Nations

To test our hypotheses that stable nations will become more stable when externally threatened, and unstable nations, less stable, nations were grouped according to their stability levels for the 1948-1965 period. Once grouped, they were then dichotomized into stable and unstable clusters (see Table II). The relationship between level of external threat and level of political instability was then explored using each group of nations separately.

Tables XI and XII show the relationship for the stable countries. Contrary to expectation, stable countries do not become more stable when externally threatened; in fact, they show a tendency to become more unstable. The correlations are low, or moderately low, but they are all positive. The tendency for greater instability in this sub-grouping is more pronounced than was found for all nations combined (Tables IX and X). This slight tendency for lesser stability in the face of external threat holds for both the simultaneous and time-lagged relationships, using both the grouped and summed measurement methods. The latter method does yield slightly higher correlations. Moderately high correlations are obtained using the summed method, for the simultaneous 1957 (r = .411) and time-lagged 1960 (r = .450) relationships.

The unstable nations (Tables XIII and XIV) do not show such a consistent tendency. Instead, they show an erratic pattern for the relationship between external threat and instability. With the grouped method (Table XIII), over half of the correlations are negative, and all are low. The range of correlations varies from -.187 to +.178. With the summed method (Table XIV), the correlations are much more erratic.

TABLE XI

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: STABLE NATIONS (GROUPED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 41

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	.266
1956	1956	.078
1957	1957	.158
1958	1958	.079
1959	1959	.168
1960	1960	.295
1961	1961	.183

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	.170
1956	1957	.293
1957	1958	.252
1958	1959	.135
1959	1960	.165
1960	1961	.177

Total Time Period:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.191

TABLE XII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: STABLE NATIONS (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 41

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	.144
1956	1956	.066
1957	1957	.411
1958	1958	.165
1959	1959	.257
1960	1960	.330
1961	1961	.260

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	.139
1956	1957	.206
1957	1958	.218
1958	1959	.302
1959	1960	.238
1960	1961	.450

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.191

TABLE XIII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: UNSTABLE NATIONS (GROUPED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 42

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	-.009
1956	1956	-.021
1957	1957	-.097
1958	1958	.178
1959	1959	-.153
1960	1960	-.087
1961	1961	.103

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.187
1956	1957	.109
1957	1958	-.072
1958	1959	.108
1959	1960	-.110
1960	1961	.051

Total Time Period:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.149

TABLE XIV

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: UNSTABLE NATIONS (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 42

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	-.125
1956	1956	-.031
1957	1957	-.025
1958	1958	.209
1959	1959	.114
1960	1960	.465
1961	1961	.460

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.037
1956	1957	-.028
1957	1958	-.027
1958	1959	-.088
1959	1960	.104
1960	1961	.463

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.149

Exactly half are negative, and the range of correlations varies from -.125 to +.465. Three moderately high correlations were obtained when using the summed method: for the 1960 (r = .465) and 1961 (r = .460) simultaneous relationships, and for the time-lagged 1960 relationship where the Pearson r is .463.

Although these correlations are not high enough to allow us to draw definitive conclusions, some clear tendencies are apparent. The stable countries show a much stronger and more consistent tendency than the unstable countries to become less stable when externally threatened. While the unstable countries show a lower overall tendency for instability in the face of external threat, if it can be construed as a tendency at all, they also show the single highest positive correlation, r = .465, for the simultaneous 1961 relationship. In fact, after 1959 the unstable countries show a greater tendency toward instability when externally threatened than the stable countries.

In sum, five conclusions can be drawn from this examination of the relationship between external threat and political instability in the stable and unstable nations. First, the relationship is rather low. Second, there is a generally stronger tendency for

instability in the stable nations. Third, correlations tend to be higher in 1960 and 1961 than in the preceding years, although this pattern emerges only when the summed measurement method is used. Fourth, similar results were obtained for both the simultaneous and time-lagged years. The fifth conclusion is that correlations tend to be slightly higher when the summed measurement method is used. With the grouped method, for example, no correlation exceeds $r = .294$. With the summed method, coefficients are as high as $r = .465$, and exceed $r = .3$ seven times. This pattern of the summed method yielding similar, but slightly higher correlations was found to hold for all variables investigated in this study. Therefore, to keep this manuscript from becoming unduly bulky, henceforth only the summed tables are included.

Sociocultural Patterns

What will be the relationship between external threat and instability for specific types of nations? To answer this question, the West European, East European, Anglo-Saxon, Asian, and Latin American sociocultural groupings are examined separately. Tables XV-XIX give the correlations obtained for each grouping.

TABLE XV

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: WEST EUROPEAN GROUPING (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 19

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	.050
1956	1956	-.129
1957	1957	.352
1958	1958	.351
1959	1959	.212
1960	1960	.712
1961	1961	.602

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.088
1956	1957	.177
1957	1958	.167
1958	1959	.435
1959	1960	.115
1960	1961	.768

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.476

TABLE XVI

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: EAST EUROPEAN GROUPING (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 10

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	.338
1956	1956	.202
1957	1957	.034
1958	1958	.664
1959	1959	.318
1960	1960	.032
1961	1961	.405

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.108
1956	1957	.230
1957	1958	.185
1958	1959	.389
1959	1960	.126
1960	1961	.347

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.505

TABLE XVII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: ANGLO-SAXON GROUPING (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 8

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	-.148
1956	1956	.188
1957	1957	.279
1958	1958	.069
1959	1959	.265
1960	1960	.372
1961	1961	.918

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	.166
1956	1957	.283
1957	1958	.043
1958	1959	.333
1959	1960	.169
1960	1961	.906

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.560

TABLE XVIII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: ASIAN GROUPING (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 24

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	-.133
1956	1956	-.001
1957	1957	-.052
1958	1958	-.133
1959	1959	.374
1960	1960	.279
1961	1961	.079

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.011
1956	1957	-.083
1957	1958	-.174
1958	1959	-.172
1959	1960	.180
1960	1961	-.182

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.112

TABLE XIX

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: LATIN AMERICAN GROUPING (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 19

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	-.064
1956	1956	-.226
1957	1957	-.242
1958	1958	.194
1959	1959	.437
1960	1960	.325
1961	1961	.401

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.067
1956	1957	-.099
1957	1958	.225
1958	1959	.055
1959	1960	.455
1960	1961	.544

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.072

In the West European grouping (Table XV) correlations are predominantly positive; only two correlations are negative, and these are quite low. In the years prior to 1960, correlations are all low, except for the time-lagged 1958 relationship where it is moderately high (r = .435). In 1960 and 1961 the correlations are high, reaching an r of .768 for the time-lagged 1960 relationship. The overall relationship for the entire 1955-1961 period, combined, is moderately high (r = .476). There is thus a stronger tendency for decreased stability in the West European grouping than was found for the stable countries.

The East European cluster (Table XVI) shows a pattern similar to the West European. The relationship is overwhelmingly positive; there is only one low, negative correlation. There are, however, not as many high correlations as were observed for the West European grouping. Only one correlation can be classified as high, an r of .664 for the simultaneous 1958 relationship. A striking difference between the East and West European groupings is the low correlation obtained in East Europe for the simultaneous 1960 relationship (r = .032). This also contrasts with the 1960 relationship for the stable countries.

The Anglo-Saxon grouping (Table XVII) shows a pattern similar to the West and East European groupings. Correlations are predominantly positive (only one is negative) and low, except for the simultaneous 1961 (r = .918), and time-lagged 1960 (r = .906) years, where they are extremely high. The 1955-1961 relationship is higher than in either West or East Europe.

It should be kept in mind that in these three groupings, particularly the East European and Anglo-Saxon, the number of countries is quite low. Thus these high correlations must be interpreted with some reservation.

In the Asian grouping (Table XVIII), there is no clear relationship between external threat and instability. If anything, there seems a slight tendency for increased stability in the face of external threats. Nine of the fourteen correlations are negative, including the time-lagged 1960 relationship, where we have previously observed moderate to high positive correlations for other groupings. The 1955-1961 relationship (r = .112) is lower than it has been for any previous grouping.

The Latin American grouping (Table XIX) shows an erratic pattern quite similar to the unstable countries

(Table XIV). Variation in the correlation range is particularly extreme, ranging from -.242 to +.544. Following the prevailing pattern, the time-lagged 1960 ($\underline{r}$ = .544) and simultaneous 1961 ($\underline{r}$ = .401) relationships are moderately high. A moderately high correlation was also obtained for the simultaneous and time-lagged 1959 relationships ($\underline{r}$ = .437 and .455, respectively). Of all the groupings investigated thus far, the Latin American grouping shows the lowest overall, 1955-1961 product moment correlation, $\underline{r}$ = .072.

One may wonder if the differing results shown for the sociocultural groupings is due largely to the fact that some groupings are more threatened than others. As Table XX shows, however, external threats appear to be relatively uniform across sociocultural boundaries. The Anglo-Saxon and Latin American groupings are somewhat less threatened than the other groupings, but the difference does not seem very large.

In conclusion, it is the predominantly stable West European, East European, and Anglo-Saxon sociocultural groupings which show the strongest tendency for decreased stability when externally threatened. The Asian and Latin American groupings, whose members are mostly unstable (see Table II), show an erratic and

TABLE XX

MEAN EXTERNAL THREAT SCORES, 1955-1961
(GROUPED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Cluster	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1955-61
West European	1428	1857	2272	2271	1900	2648	2329	4182
East European	1203	3517	2906	1808	2810	2418	2424	4888
Anglo-Saxon	0502	0630	0630	2260	1630	2904	1263	3071
Asian	1505	1591	1925	2047	1546	1837	3383	4171
Latin American	1108	0158	0685	2055	1424	1644	1954	3451
Overall mean	1245	1406	1692	2114	1704	1989	2397	3947

generally less pronounced tendency for decreased stability. These results are not surprising in view of the previous findings for the stable and unstable countries, but are surprising with regard to our hypotheses.

The moderately high, positive correlations observed for both the stable and unstable countries in 1960 and 1961 emerged for all sociocultural groupings, except the Asian. Also, as with the stable and unstable countries, for the sociocultural groupings, the simultaneous and time-lagged relationships were quite similar.

Traditional, Transitional, and Modern Nations

It could be inferred from the findings obtained from the sociocultural groupings that the developed nations will show a more pronounced tendency toward instability when internationally threatened than do the underdeveloped nations. This possibility can be tested by dividing the sample of nations according to level of development. This yields three groups: traditional, transitional, and modern nations (see Table V).

Table XXI reports the relationship between external threat and instability for the traditional nations. Not surprisingly, since seventeen of the

twenty-two traditional nations also belong to the Asian sociocultural cluster, the traditional nations follow closely the pattern observed for the Asian grouping. There is no clear relationship between the variables external threat and political instability. The correlations are all low, and nearly half of them are negative. The highest positive correlation is only r = .181; the highest negative, only r = -.211. The 1955-1961 relationship is positive, but low (r = .151). In the time-lagged 1960 and simultaneous 1961 relationships, correlations are low, a striking contrast with previous findings, although consistent with the Asian grouping.

The transitional nations (Table XXII), like the traditional nations, show no relationship between external threat and political instability. All correlations are low, or moderately low, except for the time-lagged 1960 relationship, where there is an r of .464. There appear, however, to be differences between how the transitional and traditional nations are affected by international threats. The relationship is slightly more positive in the transitional countries. There are fewer negative correlations, and the positive correlations are slightly higher. The 1955-1961 relationship

is also higher (an r of .215 as compared to an r of .151). The transitional countries also show a more erratic pattern; the range of correlation coefficients varies from $r = -.149$ to $r = .464$. Finally, the transitional states tend to follow the moderately high, positive correlation pattern for 1960 and 1961.

The modern nations (Table XXIII) show a clear and consistent tendency for decreased stability when externally threatened. All correlations are positive, and over half of them are high, or moderately high. This result is not surprising in view of the previous finding that stable countries tend to become less stable when threatened, since modern nations are predominantly stable. Only four of the twenty-four modern nations are unstable for the 1948-1965 period--East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Argentina, and France (see Table II). A particularly interesting finding for the modern nations is the consistency of the correlation coefficients, both simultaneous and time-lagged. After 1956, with only two exceptions, correlations are moderately high, and strikingly similar. This consistency lends support to the validity of the finding.

In conclusion, little relationship was found between external threat and instability in the

TABLE XXI

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: TRADITIONAL NATIONS (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 22

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	-.082
1956	1956	-.148
1957	1957	.168
1958	1958	.043
1959	1959	.107
1960	1960	.181
1961	1961	-.033

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.067
1956	1957	.119
1957	1958	.052
1958	1959	-.111
1959	1960	.179
1960	1961	-.211

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.151

TABLE XXII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: TRANSITIONAL NATIONS (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 37

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	-.149
1956	1956	.118
1957	1957	.146
1958	1958	.060
1959	1959	.206
1960	1960	.316
1961	1961	.351

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.030
1956	1957	.007
1957	1958	-.033
1958	1959	-.148
1959	1960	.171
1960	1961	.464

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.215

TABLE XXIII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: MODERN NATIONS (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 24

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	.023
1956	1956	.258
1957	1957	.396
1958	1958	.523
1959	1959	.290
1960	1960	.448
1961	1961	.431

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	.019
1956	1957	.448
1957	1958	.416
1958	1959	.465
1959	1960	.247
1960	1961	.580

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.474

traditional and transitional countries. Consistent with our hypothesis, however, the transitional countries did show a stronger tendency than the traditional nations to become less stable when externally threatened. While the transitional and modern nations follow the moderately high, positive, relationship for 1960 and 1961, the traditional nations follow the Asian grouping in deviating from this pattern. An inspection of the simultaneous and time-lagged relationships reveals that, again, similar results were obtained.

Coercive, Moderately Coercive, and Permissive Nations

We have hypothesized a negative correlation between international threat and political instability for both the permissive and coercive states, and a positive correlation for the moderately coercive states. These hypotheses can be tested by dividing the eighty-three-nation sample according to level of regime permissiveness-coerciveness. Three levels, corresponding to the hypothesized relationship, were distinguished: coercive, moderately coercive, and permissive states (see Table IV).

Table XXIV shows the relationship between external threat and instability for the coercive nations. As the magnitude and direction of the correlations reveal, there is no clear relationship. Eight of the correlations are negative, six are positive, and all are low, except for the moderately high, time-lagged 1960 relationship where there is an r of .430. This pattern is quite similar to the one presented by the unstable nations. Since the coercive nations are not predominantly unstable,[1] this finding is surprising. It indicates that coercion may, in fact, be quite influential in the external threat-instability relationship.

The moderately coercive nations (Table XXV) show a mixed pattern. Previous to 1960 there is no relationship; the highest product moment correlation is only $r = .213$. After 1959, however, there is a high, positive relationship, reaching a high of $r = .764$. The post-1959 relationship is thus consistent with the hypothesis. Though mostly unstable,[2] the moderately coercive nations follow a pattern more closely related to the stable nations. An interesting finding, indeed.

Contrary to hypothesis, the permissive nations (Table XXVI) show a rather strong tendency toward instability when externally threatened. All correlations

TABLE XXIV

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: COERCIVE NATIONS (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 27

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	-.155
1956	1956	-.072
1957	1957	-.129
1958	1958	-.083
1959	1959	.129
1960	1960	.194
1961	1961	.185

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	-.049
1956	1957	-.024
1957	1958	.108
1958	1959	-.123
1959	1960	-.041
1960	1961	.430

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.223

TABLE XXV

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: MODERATELY COERCIVE NATIONS (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 35

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	.103
1956	1956	-.089
1957	1957	.148
1958	1958	.196
1959	1959	.213
1960	1960	.764
1961	1961	.619

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	.174
1956	1957	.137
1957	1958	.026
1958	1959	-.009
1959	1960	.296
1960	1961	.655

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.270

TABLE XXVI

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: PERMISSIVE NATIONS (SUMMED MEASUREMENT METHOD)

Simultaneous Relationships: N = 21

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1955	.139
1956	1956	.045
1957	1957	.308
1958	1958	.342
1959	1959	.344
1960	1960	.531
1961	1961	.663

Time Lagged Relationships:

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955	1956	.053
1956	1957	.347
1957	1958	.254
1958	1959	.740
1959	1960	.394
1960	1961	.698

Total Time Period (Grouped Measurement Method):

Independent Variable (External Threat)	Dependent Variable (Political Instability)	r
1955-61	1955-61	.231

are positive, three of them highly: the simultaneous 1961 relationship (r = .663), and the time-lagged 1958 (r = .740) and 1960 (r = .698) relationships. Most correlations, however, are moderately low, including the 1955-1961 relationship, which shows a r of .231. The permissive states, as with the moderately coercive and several other clusters which we have examined, show significantly higher positive correlations for the post-1959 years.

The permissiveness-coerciveness clusters thus do not follow hypothesis. The moderately coercive nations are somewhat consistent with hypothesis in that the relationship between external threat and political instability is predominantly positive. The relationship for 1960 and 1961 follows the hypothesis. In the coercive nations, there is no clear tendency to become more or less stable when internationally threatened. This, in itself, is an interesting finding, since the general tendency in nearly all clusters observed thus far has been for decreased stability. The permissive countries show a strong tendency to become less stable when externally threatened.

Temporal Sequence

We have thus far assumed that instability is independent from the variable of external threat. This assumption naturally presupposes that external threats (the cause) precede political instability (the effect) in a temporal sequence. For the simultaneous yearly relationships, there is no way of knowing within the limits of this design if this assumption holds. With our methodology, it is possible that a country could experience most of its instability events within a given year before being externally threatened. In this case, interpretation of derived correlation coefficients as supporting or refuting the hypothesized external threat-instability relationship would be erroneous.

There is, of course, no temporal sequence problem for the time-lagged relationships; external threats always precede the instability they are being correlated with. By comparing the time-lagged with the simultaneous relationships, we can provide at least a superficial validity check of the simultaneous correlations.

Recalling the groupings of countries examined in this chapter, it was found that correlations derived from both the simultaneous and time-lagged years tended to be similar. In the eighty-three-nation sample, for

example, a comparison of the rank orders of the simultaneous and time-lagged relationships yields a Spearman correlation coefficient of $p = .86$, which is satisfactorily high. This does not mean that for the simultaneous relationship external threats always precede instability in a temporal sequence. It means that any reverse sequence (instability preceding threat) which may be operating does not seem to be systematically influencing the findings.

External Aggression and the External Threat-Instability Relationship

Since external threat and external aggression are closely related phenomena, there is the possibility that external aggression might be confounding the external threat-instability relationship. There is also the possibility that external aggression may be intervening in the relationship, since it may also influence instability. It could be, then, that it is external aggression and not international threat which causes increased instability.

To determine the influence of external aggression in the external threat-instability relationship, a hypothetical causal model is set up.[3] In this model,

the variables external threat, external aggression, and instability, are included. By calculating partial correlations and differences in the degree of fit of the best causal path, the influence of external aggression can be empirically ascertained. In using this technique, the effect of external aggression is held constant while the direct relationship between external threat and instability is determined. If the magnitude of the correlation coefficient decreases significantly, then the influence of external aggression in the relationship is important. If the correlation coefficient does not decrease significantly, then it can be concluded that the influence of external aggression is not important.

In choosing to set up such a model, a proper time period had to be chosen. It would not make much sense to choose years for which correlation coefficients are extremely low, as in the case for the years prior to 1960. We want years for which correlations are sufficiently high to give the model empirical and theoretical meaning. We also want the model to apply in the most general sense. Thus in establishing a causal model, we include all eighty-three nations and use only the 1960 and 1961 relationships, derived from the summed

measurement method. In order to lend support to the validity of the causal model, three separate models, differing only in the time periods they cover, are set up: one for 1960, one for 1961, and one time-lagged from 1960 to 1961. If similar results are obtained with each of the models, it can be more confidently concluded that the findings are valid.

The models, with product moment correlations are presented in Figure 1. These models are recursive; the direction of the causal relationship has been drawn based a priori on the theoretical discussions in this study.[4] Our first objective is to calculate partial correlations between external threat and instability, controlling for external aggression. For this purpose, the following partial correlation formula is used.

$$r_{13.2} = \frac{r_{13} - (r_{12} \cdot r_{32})}{\sqrt{(1 - r_{12}^2)(1 - r_{32}^2)}}$$

The respective partial correlations obtained for each model are shown in Figure 1.

It is clear from these models that although external threat and external aggression are highly interrelated, they have different influences on instability. The coefficients between external aggression and



$r_{13.2} = .315$

Model 1. 1960



$r_{13.2} = .309$

Model 2. 1961



$r_{13.2} = .397$

Model 3. 1960 Time-lagged to 1961

FIGURE 1

CAUSAL MODELS (EXTERNAL AGGRESSION)

instability are significantly lower than between external threat and instability, and the partial correlations obtained when controlling for external aggression differ only slightly from the direct external threat-instability coefficients. These findings indicate that external aggression has very little influence in the external threat-instability relationship. We can therefore conclude that, at least within the limits of this hypothetical model, the relationship between external threat and instability is "true," and not spurious.[5]

Employing the appropriate best fit causal formula, we can determine if external aggression is intervening in the external threat-to-instability path. These calculations are presented in Table XXVII.

The large differences in degrees of fit shown in Table XXVII for the three models indicate that external aggression is not intervening in the external threat-instability causal sequence. Thus it is apparent from these causal models that external aggression is neither a confounding nor an intervening variable.

Coercion and the External Threat-Instability Relationship

We have theorized that when nations are externally threatened government officials may endeavor to

TABLE XXVII

INTERNATIONAL THREAT, EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY CAUSAL PATHS

Predictions		Degree of Fit	
Model	Actual	Predicted	Difference
1. $r_{13} = r_{12}\, r_{23}$	(.818) (.170) = .1331	.319	.1859
2. $r_{13} = r_{12}\, r_{23}$	(.648) (.123) = .0797	.312	.2323
3. $r_{13} = r_{12}\, r_{23}$	(.818) (.237) = .1939	.416	.2221

suppress conflict by coercing citizens. There is a possibility, then, that coercion is an influential variable in the external threat-instability sequence. To test this possibility, three causal models similar to those shown in Figure 1, were drawn with coercion being substituted for external aggression as the third variable in the models. These models appear in Figure 2. Table XXVIII gives the degree of fit calculations for the three causal models.

These models yield contradictory findings. In Models 1 and 2, it appears that coercion is, in fact, influential in the external threat-instability relationship. The degree of fit difference is within acceptable limits, and the partial correlation between external threat and instability, controlling for coercion, differs significantly from the unmediated external threat-instability relationship. In Model 3, however, the influence of coercion does not appear to be significant. Only one possible explanation of the disparity between Model 3, and Models 1 and 2, is apparent. This is that coercion may have only a temporary effect on instability; the longer the time period after the external threat, the less influential is coercion. This explanation, however, is highly speculative, and cannot be made



$r_{13.2} = .143$

Model 1. 1960



$r_{13.2} = .118$

Model 2. 1961



$r_{13.2} = .326$

Model 3. 1960 Time-lagged to 1961

FIGURE 2

CAUSAL MODELS (COERCION)

TABLE XXVIII

INTERNATIONAL THREAT, COERCION, AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY CAUSAL PATHS

Predictions		Degree of Fit	
Model	Actual	Predicted	Difference
1. $r_{13} = r_{12}\, r_{23}$	(.291) (.869) = .252	.319	.067
2. $r_{13} = r_{12}\, r_{23}$	(.317) (.749) = .2374	.312	.075
3. $r_{13} = r_{12}\, r_{23}$	(.291) (.507) = .1475	.416	.269

with any degree of certainty from the information available in this study.

We also cannot definitively say which model depicts the role of regime coercion in the external threat-instability relationship. Model 3 would seem to be the "safest," since it is certain in this model that external threat and coercion do precede instability in a temporal sequence. This is of particular importance with respect to coercion, since the relationship between coercion and instability is quite likely reciprocal (symmetrical); that is, coercion could increase as a function of instability, as well as vice versa. However, the similar results obtained in both Models 1 and 2 lend at least tacit support to the validity of these findings. Therefore, all that can be concluded from the external threat-coercion-instability causal models is that the influence of regime coercion is not clear.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1]Fifteen of the twenty-seven coercive nations are unstable for the 1948-1965 period.

[2]Twenty-six of the thirty-five moderately coercive nations are unstable for the 1948-1965 period.

[3]It is commonly held by researchers who are interested in the notion of causality that the use of hypothetical causal models is quite useful, since such models are not subject to many of the limitations and criticism that would apply to discussions of the real world. As Blalock says, ". . . by thinking in terms of models, we need not be concerned with our inability to demonstrate causality in the real world," Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 14. See also John D. Trimmer, Response to Physical Systems (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1950); and Mario Bunge, Causality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).

[4]A recursive system is one in which two-way causation can be ruled out (Blalock, Ibid., pp. 54-60).

[5]According to Herbert Simon, the problem of demonstrating causality can be reduced to making a distinction whether the correlation between variables is "true," and not spurious. See Simon, "Spurious Correlations: A Causal Interpretation," Journal of Statistical Association, XLIX (September, 1954), 467-479; and Blalock, "Spuriousness Versus Intervening Variables: The Problem of Temporal Sequence," Social Forces, XL (May, 1962), 330-336.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It was found in this study that there was very little relationship between external threat and political instability. What little relationship there was, however, tended to be predominantly positive. This pattern first emerged for all eighty-three nations taken as an aggregate, and subsequently held, in varying degrees, for most of the specific groupings of countries investigated. Though most correlations were low, some interesting tendencies were revealed.

In testing the hypothesis that stable nations will become more stable when threatened by a foreign nation, or nations, it was found that the behavior of these nations did not accord with the hypothesis. They showed a small tendency to become less stable when threatened. It was postulated that the unstable nations would become less stable when externally threatened. They also failed to follow the hypothesis. For the unstable nations, no clear relationship was found between external threat and political instability. Similarly, those sociocultural groupings which are mostly stable--the West and East European, and Anglo-Saxon--showed

greater tendencies for decreased stability in the face of international threats than the predominantly unstable Asian and Latin American groupings, where no clear relationship was found.

Contrary to hypothesis, modern nations showed a rather strong and consistent tendency to become less stable when externally threatened. In contrast, for the less stable traditional and transitional nations, no clear relationship between external threat and instability was found. Also, counter to hypothesis, a strong positive relationship was found in the permissive countries, while the moderately coercive countries showed an erratic relationship, and the coercive countries, no relationship.

Another interesting finding was that for nearly all groupings of countries investigated, there was a moderately high, positive relationship between external threat and instability for 1960 and 1961. This finding contrasted strikingly with the consistently low correlations found for the years prior to 1960.

The general patterns revealed in this study held, within satisfactory limits, for both the simultaneous and time-lagged relationships, using both the summed and

grouped measurement methods. This can be viewed as a tentative validation of the findings.

In attempting to demonstrate that international threat is, in fact, a cause of instability, two possible confounding variables, external aggression and coercion, were examined in hypothetical causal models. Partial correlations and differences in degree of fit calculated from these models showed that external aggression is not influential in the external threat-instability relationship. The influence of coercion, however, was not clearly ascertained, since conflicting results were obtained.

Having briefly summarized the general findings of this study, let us now attempt to interpret and explain them. Several possible explanations present themselves, and there is no way to determine accurately which is the more correct. At best, we can list some possible explanations which seem plausible.

The immediate explanation of our finding that there is a very small relationship between external threat and political instability is that the social psychological theory concerning the external threat-cohesion relationship is not applicable for such large, complex groups as political systems. We could argue

that although the theory has been substantiated in controlled, small group experiments, it does not hold in more general cases. In political systems there is a greater likelihood of internal fissures, both latent and overt, than in small, voluntary groups.

This explanation is only speculative. From the findings in this study, it cannot be concluded that we have disproven the theory. We have, at best, questioned its relevance for political systems. Additional research in this area is necessary before any definitive conclusions can be drawn. It may well be that the theory is applicable for political systems, but that verification of its relevance requires a more complex methodology than was employed in this attempt. Specific methodological problems are discussed later in this chapter.

The finding that stable countries show a more pronounced tendency than unstable countries to become less stable when externally threatened, casts serious doubt on Coser's supposition that the greater the cohesiveness of a group, the greater is the likelihood that the group will become more cohesive when it is threatened. Prior to 1960, the unstable countries, if anything, show a slight tendency for increased stability

in the face of external threats. Two possible explanations of this finding are offered here.

A first explanation involves the possibility that low-level international threats may be functional for increased stability in unstable nations. Inspection of mean threat scores for the unstable countries for the 1955-1961 period reveals that external threat levels are significantly lower prior to 1960.[1] Since the relationship between external threat and instability in the unstable states for these low-level threat years tends to be negative, it may be that low-level threats function to increase cohesion. They could serve this positive function by providing a stimulus for unity in these low-cohesive countries where there are few alternative sources of cohesion. Coser does speak of low-level conflict as being functional for the long-run stability of groups. Could not this same line of thinking be used to apply to low-level external threats? Specifically, external threats would instigate low-level conflict which would function to enhance overall stability by alleviating internal frustrations and tensions. High-level threats, on the other hand, would not serve a cathartic and integrative function in unstable countries, since they would be likely to lead to

increased deprivation. Such an increase in deprivation would be intolerable in countries which are likely already highly relatively deprived.[2] The possible positive function of low-level threats suggests an interesting problem for future investigation.

Another possible explanation of the finding that the unstable nations show a less pronounced tendency for instability in the face of international threats than do the stable nations, is that the unstable countries cannot afford additional internal conflict. Increase in the level of internal conflict could result in the complete collapse of their regimes. Therefore, when threatened in the international arena, unstable nations may be forced to resort to coercion to maintain relative calm. The stable countries, on the other hand, can allow some internal conflict since their regimes are more firmly established. They thus do not have to suppress minor conflict which might be instigated by international threats. The presence of negative and low positive correlations obtained for the unstable countries may thus have stemmed from the fact that internal conflict had been suppressed. In order to test this possibility, a systematic investigation of the variables of external threat, coercion, and instability for both

unstable and stable nations would have to be conducted. This suggests an interesting problem for future research.

An explanation should also be offered concerning the erratic pattern found for the unstable countries and those country-groupings which are predominantly unstable (the Asian, Latin American, transitional, and moderately coercive). The internal situations in these groups of countries would tend to be more volatile than in the stable groupings, where internal situations are more normalized. One would thus expect groupings which are predominantly unstable to show more erratic patterns.

There is an additional possible explanation why modern nations tend to become less stable when externally threatened. Modern nations have more developed communication systems than nonmodern nations.[3] With their highly developed media, there is the possibility that when externally threatened many different interpretations and explanations of the threat will be presented. These interpretations may vary in emphasis, seriousness, and perception. Therefore, there is the likelihood that citizens in modern nations will have differing interpretations of international threats.

Moreover, even if the threat is widely and rather uniformly perceived, there is the added possibility that there will be differing attitudes regarding how to deal with it. Therefore, competing solutions to the threat may be more readily perceived.

In transitional and traditional countries, on the other hand, where the media of communications are less developed, the reporting of external threats will be more uniform. There will be a lower tendency for citizens to perceive threats differently. Also, since citizens in nonmodern nations tend to be illiterate or semi-literate, it may be that a substantial sector of the population will not even be aware that their country is being threatened by a foreign nation. Since, as we pointed out in Chapter II, it is important that external threats be commonly perceived, there may be a greater chance for threats to be unifying in the nonmodern than in the modern states.

If we are correct in these speculations, then it could also be presumed that coercive nations should exhibit a lower tendency for decreased stability when externally threatened than do permissive nations. This is because in coercive nations the media are effectively controlled by the political leadership, who can

manipulate the reporting of international threats for their own purposes. The contrasting results obtained in Tables XXIV and XXVI lend support to this possibility.

Several possible factors could account for the finding that for nearly all clusters of nations examined in this study, correlations between external threat and instability in 1960 and 1961 are positive and high, or moderately high. Three possible explanations are offered here.

The first explanation is operational. It involves the single data source used for measuring both instability and external threat--Deadline Data on World Affairs. Judging from the amount of information given on the various world internal and external aggressive events, and also from the increased number of events recorded, Deadline Data has improved considerably over the years, most noticeably since 1960. It could possibly be, then, that previous to 1960 many events were not reported, or were inadequately reported. If this were so, then the correlation coefficients between external threat and instability for the years 1955-1959 might be lower than they should be.

As a second possible explanation, it may be that external threats will not have any systematic effect on

stability until a sufficiently high threat level--a threshold level--is reached. That is, at some point a country may become sufficiently threatened so that tensions and frustrations instigated by the threats find internal outlets. We have previously implied the existence of some threshold level of threat when discussing the possible positive function of low-level threats for the unstable nations. Does a threshold level, in fact, exist?

A simple test, which will give an indication of the existence of a threshold level, is to compare the yearly external threat mean values (refer to Table XX) with the direction of the yearly simultaneous and time-lagged correlations for each sociocultural grouping (refer to Tables XV-XIX). Employing this technique, it is revealed that in every instance where mean external threat scores for the sociocultural groupings are greater than 2000 (thirteen cases), except one (Asia, 1958), the relationship between external threat and political instability is positive. Specifically, there are twenty-one positive, and two negative, correlations.[4] Where mean external threat scores are below 2000 (twenty-two cases), there is no systematic pattern concerning the direction of the relationship; twenty-six of

the correlations are positive, and sixteen are negative. Since mean external threat scores are comparatively high for 1960 and 1961, this could explain the frequent, moderately high, positive correlations for these years.

It should be noted that using mean scores as we have done here greatly oversimplifies the complex problem of ascertaining a threshold level of external threat. The threshold level, if existent, would undoubtedly vary from country to country. It would be necessary to analyze each country individually and then draw general conclusions--a task which makes the case study approach more applicable. A concentration on general trends, at the expense of analyzing interesting individual behavior, is one of the prices we chose to pay in selecting the cross-national over the single country approach.

Related to the second possible explanation is the notion of a linkage between levels of external and domestic conflict. This is a problem to which many investigators, Rosenau in particular, have devoted considerable attention.[5] Perhaps level of domestic instability is related to level of international hostility; when international aggression is high throughout the world, internal aggression will also reach high levels.

Thus countries would experience increased instability regardless of whether or not they were directly threatened. Since, as Chambers found, international aggression is significantly higher for 1960 and 1961 than in the previous five years, this could account for the high level of internal instability.[6]

We can thus offer no definitive explanation for the 1960-1961 pattern. It could be a chance occurrence, although this possibility seems remote. It could also be the result of some exogenous factor which has not been included in this design. At any rate, it is an interesting problem which merits further investigation.

In an exploratory endeavor of such wide scope as this, one could hardly expect precise results. Although correlations tended to be rather low, some interesting findings were revealed. Reflecting on these findings, one can speculate on the possible focus of future studies designed to refine and extend investigation of the external threat-cohesion problem.

Future studies designed to refine the present study should focus on the problem of national perception of international threats. A country cannot be expected to be affected by an external threat if its citizens do not perceive that a threat exists. Inclusion of the

perception of external threats into a research design would, however, be an imposing task, requiring survey research or content analysis.[7]

Related to the national perception of threats, is the problem of invented or exaggerated "threats." Nations may, and frequently do, invent or exaggerate threats, and this action may have a significant effect on internal cohesion. Since such threats are not "real," we cannot measure them as we have done in this study. We may thus be grossly underestimating how "threatened" nations actually perceive themselves to be. As with the perception of real threats, approaching this problem would seem to point to survey research or content analysis.

It is not certain just how the presence of invented or exaggerated external threats might have influenced the findings in this study, if at all. It seems that such threats are believed to lead to increased stability, or else why do so many leaders endeavor to invent or exaggerate them? Their intuition, however, may be invalid, or it may apply only under a specific set of circumstances. One possible circumstance might be when the political leadership effectively control the means of communication.

One may also want to examine how external threats are dealt with by political leaders. If they are not dealt with properly, national morale may decline with the concomitant result of decreased cohesion. In assessing the way external threats are handled, the following questions are helpful: Are national goals and priorities with respect to the external threat clear? Is the leadership responsive to public opinion regarding the threat? Was the threat satisfactorily resolved, if resolved at all? Inclusion of the variable, morale, in future designs would be a difficult task since morale is, itself, a highly ambiguous and complex group property. It seems that only survey research, designed to assess individual attitudes concerning specific external threats, would suffice.

In focusing on the problems of perception of real and invented external threats and morale, we have envisioned difficult operational problems. Such problems would be even more acute in massive cross-national endeavors. Therefore, it seems that pilot attempts at examining these complex problems should be limited in scope. It may be that to illuminate the influence of these factors in the external threat-instability relationship, one should begin on a case study level. If

these factors appear, indeed, to be important, then designs can be devised to investigate them on a broader scale.

In refining future attempts at testing the external threat-cohesion theory, the influence of coercion in the relationship must be clearly determined. The technique used in this study to examine the influence of coercion may be adequate. However, our conflicting results point to the need for a more detailed analysis, perhaps employing a different time period.

Another problem concerns the power level of the threatening nation. Should the power level of the threatening nation be considered when measuring the intensity of an international threat? In other words, is a threat perpetrated by a great power toward a particular nation more intense than the same threat by a lesser power? And, if so, is the cohesion of the threatened nation affected differently? In meeting this problem, it would be necessary to weight external threats in some manner, for the power level of the threatening nation.[8] Future research, experimenting with different weightings, is required to determine the most accurate weighting, if, indeed, a weighting is necessary.

These are the main suggestions for future studies which might be conducted in this area. They have occurred to the researcher throughout the course of this investigation; others may occur to the reader. The present study should be judged as an exploratory effort which yielded interesting findings that question the applicability of the external threat-instability relationship for political systems. It should also be judged for its specific suggestions for future inquiries. The field is wide open for research and could prove quite rewarding to interested investigators.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

[1]The external threat mean scores for the unstable nations are:

Grouped		Summed	
1955	1218	1955	3.86
1956	1579	1956	8.55
1957	1840	1957	6.74
1958	2267	1958	5.79
1959	1910	1959	5.45
1960	2130	1960	11.21
1961	3011	1961	11.05

[2]Deprivation would tend to increase in the unstable countries since leaders would be forced to divert attention away from pressing domestic problems to deal with the external threat.

[3]Included as indicators in the operationalization of modernity are: number of radios/1000 population; number of newspapers/1000 population; and percentage literate.

[4]The two negative correlations are for the simultaneous and time-lagged relationships in Asia in 1958.

[5]James Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), revised edition, 1969; International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964); (ed.), Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: Free Press, 1969).

[6]The yearly frequency of external aggression events, as found by Chambers ("Hostility and Amity in International Relations," unpublished Master's thesis, San Diego State College, August, 1966, p. 60), is as follows:

1955	160	1959	221
1956	281	1960	625
1957	257	1961	513
1958	216		

It is thus clear that the frequency of external

aggression is much greater in 1960 and 1961 than in the previous five years.

[7]As an example of the utility of content analysis in this area, Ole Holsti used content analysis to show that consensus within the Soviet Union and Communist China with respect to Sino-Soviet relations increases as East-West conflict (the external threat) increases. See Holsti, "External Conflict and Internal Consensus: The Sino-Soviet Case," in Philip Stone, et al. (eds.), The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M. I. T. Press, 1966). Great strides have been made in the area of content analysis in recent years. Procedures have become more refined and standardized, and the use of the computer is rapidly eliminating the traditional drawback of the technique--time. The technique is thus becoming increasingly more practical to use in research. Perhaps, then, in the near future, a cross-national content analysis endeavor will not be so impractical. For an up-to-date assessment of the status of content analysis today, see Stone, Ibid.

[8]A rather simple method of weighting for the power level of the threatening nation is suggested here. First, the power level of nations is measured cross-nationally (perhaps as a function of total GNP). Nations are then rank-ordered according to their power level scores, and then divided into five dimensions (e.g., super powers, large powers, medium powers, low powers, and very low powers). To include the power level of the threatening nation in the measurement of an international threat, one need simply multiply the intensity scale value of the threat by the power level of the threatening nation. For example, if the United States (power Level 5) threatens Peru with withdrawal of foreign aid (external threat scale Level 3), then the modified intensity level of the external threat would be $3 \times 5 = 15$. This technique would be time-consuming since this procedure would have to be done for every threat perpetrated during the time period under investigation. The result would be external threat scores weighted for the power of the threatening nation.

It may be that the power level of the threatened nation should also be taken into account. To do this, one could distinguish a "net power factor." This factor could be obtained by subtracting the power level of the

threatened nation from the power level of the threatening nation. If a positive result is obtained (indicating the threatening nation is more powerful), the subtracted difference is then multiplied by the scale intensity value of the threat, yielding an external threat score weighted for net power difference. If a negative result is obtained, then the external threat is not weighted for power level.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

FEIERABEND, FEIERABEND, AND NESVOLD SCALE OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY EVENTS

FEIERABEND, FEIERABEND, AND NESVOLD SCALE OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY EVENTS

This is a consensual scale that estimates different intensity levels of aggressive behavior in instability events. Each specific event in the data bank receives one of the seven scale values. Zero scale value connotes an absence of instability, while scale position 6 indicates extreme instability. Values 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are the intermediate intensities between the two extreme values. This scale is described and used in Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, "Correlates of Political Stability," and Nesvold, Modernity, Social Frustration, and Stability of Political Systems.

The seven points of the scale connote differing degrees of disturbance within a given political system likely to lead to governmental overthrowal.

0 = Point 0 on the scale may be characterized as extreme political stability. No disturbance is observable in the political system. If change occurs in the arrangements of the system, it is carried out in an orderly, routine-like fashion, according to rules institutionally prescribed. Item typical of Point 0: Elections (institutionally prescribed).

1 = Point 1 on the scale still connotes stability. Nevertheless, the political system labors under mild strain. Changes in the arrangements of the system are still carried out in an orderly fashion, and for the most part within the limits of the rules institutionally prescribed, but in a way that may be characterized as less than routine. An aura of mild crisis is in the air. Items typical for Point 1:

- Dissolution of legislature (institutionally sanctioned)
- Significant change of constitution by amendment
- Resignation of significant political figure(s) (for other than personal reasons)

Fall of cabinet (in response to nonconfidence motion)
Dismissal of significant political figure(s) (for other than personal reasons)
Strike(s), peaceful, limited, short (protest action against the government)
Demonstration(s), protest movements against the government (peaceful, limited in scope)
Plebescite

2 = Point 2 on the scale connotes the presence of some disturbance. The strains within the system affecting the government (or commonly its opposition) are assuming a greater magnitude than under Point 1. Peaceful and orderly political processes are adversely affected. Impressionistically, one could say that if Points 0 and 1 denote stability, Point 2 marks mild instability, or threats to stability. Items typical of Point 2:
Demonstrations, protest movements against the government (peaceful, widespread)
Arrest(s) of member(s) of significant group(s)
Arrest(s) of significant political figure(s)
Legislation directed against significant group(s) in the society
Confiscation of property (as a measure against significant groups in society)
Significant group(s) outlawed
Strike(s), some violence, and/or widespread, and/or long in duration (protest action against government)
Suicide of significant political figure(s) (for other than personal reasons)
General Strike (demonstrating support for the government, protest action against significant group(s) in society)
General Strike (protest action against government)
Martial Law
Extremist party gains control of government
Exiles
Organization of opposition party
Boycotts

3 = Point 3 on the scale is the mid-point of the stability-instability continuum. Disturbance is intensified as compared to that found in the items under Point 2. Items typical of Point 3:
- Execution(s) of significant political figure(s)
- Assassination of significant group leader(s)
- Riot(s) (limited)
- Plot to overthrow government (no visible disturbance, few arrests, trials, exiles)

4 = Point 4 on the scale. Disturbances reach a magnitude in which the overthrow of government may be expected. Instability is clearly present. Items typical of Point 4:
- Uprising, guerrilla type, sabotage, terrorism
- Riot(s), widespread
- Mass arrests
- Coup d'etat (no visible disturbances, few arrests, trials, perhaps a few executions)
- Plot to overthrow government (with some disturbances, some arrests, and some demonstrations, some riots)
- Assassination (or attempted assassination) of Chief of State
- Execution(s) of significant political figure(s)

5 = Point 5 on the scale connotes even more intense and widespread disturbances than Point 4. Items typical of Point 5:
- Coup d'etat (some disturbances, some arrests, some demonstrations, some riots and violence)
- Plot to overthrow government (with serious disturbances, mass arrests, mass riots, violence, demonstrations)

6 = Point 6 on the scale connotes extreme instability and the following items best qualify the situation. Items typical of Point 6:
- Mass executions

Coup d'etat (serious disturbances, mass arrests, mass riots, much violence, mass demonstrations, large strata of population involved, "the air of revolution")
Civil War

APPENDIX B

FEIERABEND, FEIERABEND, AND CHAMBERS SCALE OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION EVENTS

FEIERABEND, FEIERABEND, AND CHAMBERS SCALE OF

EXTERNAL AGGRESSION EVENTS

1 = Point 1 on the scale connotes mild hostility. International relations are conducted in an aura of mild strain that is nevertheless well defined, and distinct. Under the former condition, relations are carried on in an aura of mutual concern about the occasion of the strain. The mutual concern is expressed via diplomacy in an effort to isolate and explain grievances. Under the latter condition, relations are continued in an aura of acrimony or sarcasm. Direct specification of grievance(s) and nonspecific threats are leveled via diplomatic channels and/or public communications by politically significant persons. Items typical of Point 1:
  - Diplomatic protest
  - Rejection of protest or note
  - Warning(s)
  - Request for clarification of position or action
  - Request for explanation of position or action
  - Accusation(s), e.g., statements of a derogatory nature
  - Nonspecific threats, e.g., the assertion that a serious situation exists which requires a given country to take such measures as the situation may warrant

2 = Point 2 on the scale indicates a rising level of hostility. Diplomatic relations are continued and convey semi-specific threats of reprisal, i.e., specificity of possible consequences in terms of economic, diplomatic and military action, and specific threats of possible consequences within a certain period of time in terms of economic and diplomatic actions. The genesis of deterioration of diplomatic relations is discernible, and some small popular reaction against the target party(ies) is evident. Items typical of Point 2:

Specific and semi-specific threats of negative sanctions, e.g., semi-specific threat of embargo, boycott, military action, withdrawal from alliance
Specific threats ut supra
Small-scale anti-foreign demonstrations
Expulsion or recall of a single or two lesser diplomatic officials; ban against foreign citizens entering the country
Suspension or interruption of diplomatic relations, but not severance of diplomatic relations, e.g., recall of an ambassador for "consultations"

3 = Point 3 on the scale connotes hostility on an order of magnitude that moves large numbers of the population to anomic expression of opinion against the target party. Diplomatic actions of increasing severity are undertaken with popular consensus. The situation is grave. Items typical of Point 3:
Large anti-foreign demonstrations
Recall or expulsion of lesser diplomatic officials
Diplomatic negative sanction, e.g., break-off of negotiations, conference walkout, restriction on movement of foreign diplomats in the host country
Military alert
Quasi-military actions
Withdrawal of foreign aid
Border closure
Military ultimatum or other drastic threat
Negative economic sanction against private interest, e.g., nationalization
Negative economic sanction, e.g., drastic cutback in trade
Serious negative political sanction, e.g., aid to target party's subversive group; extension of territorial waters to include target party's possessions
Boycott of selective goods
Break-off of trade agreement
Embargo on strategic materials

4 = Point 4 indicates an even more intense level of hostility than Point 3. The degree of hostility approaches a final point in a

progression of diplomatic actions and consequences so severe that the situation may be insoluble by diplomatic means. Populations are aroused and the general situation is precarious. Items typical of Point 4:
- Recall or expulsion of ambassador(s)
- Severance of diplomatic relations and other severe negative diplomatic sanctions, e.g., disavowal of a national debt; aid to target party's violent enemy; massive aid to target party's subversive group; abrogation of a treaty of alliance
- Partial mobilization
- Declaration of a national emergency
- Troop/naval/air movement
- Total boycott
- Total embargo
- Total expropriation of foreign property

5 = Point 5 on the scale connotes a magnitude in which war is expected; there is no direct official communication or contact existing between governments. Items typical of Point 5:
- Full military mobilization
- Presence of military action, on a relatively small scale
- Partial blockade

6 = Point 6 on the scale indicates more intense and widespread hostility than Point 5. Military outbreaks, short of an official declaration of war, occur between nations. Items typical of Point 6:
- Presence of military action on an intermediate scale

7 = Point 7 connotes the utmost point of hostility between nations. Items typical of Point 7:
- Presence of military action on a large scale
- Declaration of war
- Total blockade

APPENDIX C

INDICATORS ASSOCIATED WITH SCALE LEVELS OF THE PERMISSIVENESS-COERCIVENESS OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

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Rating	Description of Polity
1	Most permissive: civil rights present and protected; rights of political opposition protected, i.e., in press, par parliament, party formation, etc.; government elected at regularized intervals in fair, free elections; public opinion effective in policy formation; significant heads of government limited in power and duration of office; legislative bodies effective participants in decision process; judicial bodies independent and have regularized procedures; tradition of structures mediating between individual and central government, e.g., strong local government, states' rights, etc.; constitution representative of sectors and interests within population, respected yet not impossible to amend.
2	Moderately permissive: civil rights protected by law with perhaps occasional attempts at infringement; rights of political opposition usually protected, e.g., press occasionally reprimanded, or certain parties illegal; government elected at periodic intervals in usually fair, free elections; public opinion usually effective in policy formation; significant head of government responsible to public or popular legislature yet may be more powerful or have greater ability to perpetuate his

tenure in office;
legislative bodies usually participate in decision process;
judicial bodies adequately independent and regularized;
structures mediating between individual and central government moderately strong;
constitution representative, respected and procedures for amendment adequate.

3 Slightly permissive:
intermittent interference with protection of civil rights, e.g., press occasionally suspended or censored, states of siege occasional;
political opposition tolerated but generally ineffective, e.g., only one party effectively participates in decisions;
government elected at more or less periodic intervals in elections which are usually free;
public opinion occasionally effective in policy formation;
significant head of government not very responsible, e.g., is hereditary office, or appointive from within nonpopular legislative branch;
significant head of government may possess rather extraordinary powers within an otherwise democratic polity, or has been able to perpetuate tenure in office by changing the constitution, etc.;
legislative bodies occasionally participate in decision process;
judicial bodies adequately independent but may not have entirely fixed procedures, e.g., existence of ad hoc bodies or "drumhead courts" or military tribunals;
structures mediating between individual and central government relatively weak;

constitution rather easily altered, or, the converse, is rather difficult to amend.

4 Slightly coercive:
regular infringement of civil rights, e.g., press regularly suspended or censored, or frequent states of siege;
political opposition severely limited or harassed, e.g., occasional suspension of all parties, or opposition leaders arrested;
government changes at arbitrary intervals set by party in power; elections often interfered with or manipulated;
alternation of civilian and military government;
significant head of government irresponsible or perpetual, i.e., unlimited by constitution, tradition, etc.;
judicial bodies often interfered with by executive or legislature;
few, and very weak, structures mediate between individual and central government;
constitution unrepresentative of society, occasionally suspended or disregarded.

5 Moderately coercive:
civil rights respected in arbitrary fashion, e.g., trade unions illegal or press severely censored;
political opposition unlikely but not impossible, e.g., parties outlawed most of the time;
government perpetual, elections usually serve no democratic function;
public opinion usually disregarded in policy formation;
significant head of government irresponsible, unlimited in powers or tenure of office;
legislative bodies ineffective in policy formation;
judicial bodies dependent on executive or legislature;

constitution often suspended or extremely difficult to amend.

6 Most coercive:
civil rights nonexistent, i.e., entirely dependent on whim of government;
political opposition impossible, e.g., no parties or autonomous associational groups exist, government penetrates all institutions of society;
government perpetual, elections serve only showcase function;
public opinion disregarded in policy formation;
significant head of government has dictatorial and absolute powers;
legislative bodies serve only to reiterate executive decisions, have no powers of their own;
judicial bodies completely dependent;
no intermediary structures or institutions exist between the individual and central government;
constitution completely disregarded in practice, impossible to amend.

ABSTRACT

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This study focuses on the problem of the effects of international threats on the cohesiveness of political systems. Specifically, it is a cross-national attempt to assess whether cohesive nations become more cohesive when externally threatened, and whether low-cohesive nations become less cohesive. These postulates, derived from theories of social psychology, are the primary hypotheses tested in this study.

In order to test these hypotheses, the concepts of cohesion and external threat are translated into observational terms. Cohesion is indexed in terms of the level of conflict within nations; the greater the amount of conflict, the lower the cohesion. The level of internal conflict is conceived as a continuum. Eighty-three nations of the world are placed on this continuum according to the amount of internal aggression they experienced during the 1955-1961 period. A seven-point scale is developed for this purpose, with each point on the scale denoting a decreasing degree of cohesion.

External threat is conceived as a function of international aggression. A country is considered

threatened when it is the target of an aggressive act perpetrated by a foreign nation, or group of nations. Acts of external aggression are conceptualized similarly to acts of internal aggression. A seven-point scale ranging from low to extreme levels of external aggression is utilized. To obtain a measurement of the degree to which each of the eighty-three nations included in this study are threatened, all the external aggressive acts directed toward each nation during the 1955-1961 period are combined into yearly scores. An external threat score for the entire 1955-1961 period is also compiled.

Additional hypotheses, designed to explore further the dynamics of the external threat-cohesion relationship, are also developed and investigated. These involve use of the variables of degree of permissiveness-coerciveness and level of development of political systems. Also, five distinguishable socio-cultural groupings--West European, Anglo-Saxon, East European, Asian, and Latin American--are separately examined to see if the relationship between external threat and cohesion varies for countries of differing sociocultural characteristics.

A weak relationship is found between international threat and the cohesiveness of political systems. This relationship, however, is predominantly in the direction of decreased cohesion in the face of external threats. Contrary to hypothesis, the high cohesive nations were found to exhibit a more pronounced tendency to become less cohesive when externally threatened than the low-cohesive nations, where no clear pattern was found. Accordingly, those groupings of countries examined which tend to be highly cohesive (permissive, modern, West European, Anglo-Saxon, and East European) showed a more marked tendency to become less cohesive in the face of international threats than those groupings low in cohesion (moderately coercive, transitional, traditional, Asian, and Latin American).

Since correlation coefficients are predominantly low, no definitive conclusions are drawn in this study. Some interesting speculations, however, are offered. Foremost, is the suggestion that the theories of social psychology, which predict that groups will become more cohesive when externally threatened, do not apply when political systems are used as the basic unit of analysis.